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In recent years, universities have been accused in news stories
of becoming “trademark bullies,” entities that use their trademarks
to harass and intimidate beyond what the law can reasonably be
interpreted to allow. Universities have also intensified efforts to
gain expansive new marks. The Ohio State University’s attempt to
trademark the word “the” is probably the most notorious. There has
also been criticism of universities’ attempts to use their trademarks
to police clearly legal speech about their activities. But beyond provocative anecdotes, how can one assess whether a particular university is truly bullying, since there are entirely legitimate reasons
for universities—like all trademark holders—to assert their rights?
Online “rankings” of trademark bullies have obscure methodologies. We lack both an empirical account of major aspects of the
landscape, and a rigorous case study giving individualized, almost
ethnographic, information about what the accused academic trademark bullies think they are doing. What are their legal arguments
and how would impartial experts assess those claims? What is their
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intellectual property worldview, their idea of the role that trademarks have in the university’s mission?
In this Article, we attempt to provide an answer to those questions. We conducted the first empirical study of a prominent university’s trademark assertion practice—both the legitimate exercise
and defense of its brands and conduct that strays over the line into
bullying. To do this, we took the university popularly identified as
the number one collegiate trademark bully and conducted a comparative empirical ranking of its behavior as compared to other
classes of universities—academically elite institutions, major sports
programs and so on—to find out if any of these categories were predictors of aggressive trademark assertion. Second, we hand-coded
every single trademark opposition filed by the alleged bully over a
four-year period, assigning each one a numerical merit score. We
also analyzed the arguments that the university provided, thus allowing us not merely to identify whether this was a true case of bullying, but what the alleged bully had to say for itself. Unfortunately,
the accused bully is our own university, Duke. Is Duke an outlier or
a bellwether? There are reasons to suspect the latter. After assessing a variety of possible explanations for anomalous aggressiveness in trademark assertion, ranging from legal change and licensing culture to behavioral economics, the Article concludes with suggestions for reform, both of the law and of university practices.
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INTRODUCTION

In August of 2019, news came out that The Ohio State University was trying to trademark the word “The” for use on “clothing,
namely, t-shirts, baseball caps and hats.” 1 The internet predictably
exploded. At time of writing, the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) issued a non-final office action denying the
application for the word “The,” but the university has time to respond and the mark still registers as “Live” in the PTO’s Trademark
Electronic Search System.2
The Ohio State University is not alone. Boise State University
has claimed that it owns the right to control the use of all non-green
sporting fields.3 The purported legal grounds for this are as garishly
strange as Boise State’s own blue football field. The University of
Texas has claimed the “horns” hand sign. 4 Universities have entered
1

See U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 88/571,984 (filed Aug. 8, 2019).
See id.
3
“The mark consists of the color blue used on the artificial turf in the stadium. The
matter shown in broken lines on the drawing shows positioning of the mark and is not
claimed as a feature of the mark,” Registration No. 3,707,623; see Sam Fortier, Boise State
Mounts a Paper Defense of Its Home Turf, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 10, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/11/sports/ncaafootball/boise-state-mounts-a-paperdefense-of-its-home-turf.html [https://perma.cc/52UH-QGGU] (describing Boise State’s
expansion of its trademark claim from blue fields to non-green fields).
4
“The mark consists of a human hand with the index and small fingers extended
upward and the thumb closed over the middle and ring fingers,” Registration No. 4,535,612
(May 27, 2014); see generally Complaint, Bd. of Regents, Univ. of Tex. Sys. v. Weir, 2013
WL 419832 (W.D. Tex. 2013) (No. 1:13-cv-00071) (The lawsuit filed against the producer
of merchandise featuring “heavy metal horns” was premised on a pending application for
the 2014 registered mark; the University has since opposed many other uses of the “horns”
sign.).
2
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the beer market, selling branded brews to their fans.5 There has also
been criticism of universities’ attempts to use their trademarks to
police clearly legal speech about them. These include efforts to prevent the release of content that cast their universities in a negative
light, such as the film “Stealing Stanford”—the writers changed it
to “Stealing Harvard”—and the TV program “Felicity” which suggested that a fictional, sexually active college student went to NYU.6
Sexually active college students! What could be more ludicrous?
The writers changed the identity of the college. 7
What is going on here? When we see famous commercial brands
over-assiduously wielding their trademarks, we are unsurprised. But
why universities? A 2018 Associated Press story with the title
Trademark Bullies? Many Big Colleges Fiercely Protect Brands
suggests that the phenomenon is a pervasive one:
Never get between a university and its trademarks.
That’s the lesson dozens of people learn every year
when they unwittingly provoke the wrath of big universities and the lawyers they hire to protect their
mascots, slogans and logos. Records gathered by The
Associated Press show that some major universities
send their lawyers after even slight perceived threats
to their brands, sending flurries of letters threatening
legal action or trying to block new trademarks
deemed too close to their own. Schools say they’re
only defending themselves from merchandise counterfeiters and others looking to exploit their brands
for personal gain. But some legal experts say it often
amounts to trademark bullying, a term used when
bigger institutions use aggressive tactics to overpower their opponents in seemingly frivolous disputes. And according to some lawyers, it appears to
5

See Billy Witz, Beer, Here: Merchandising of College Sports Leads to Team-Branded
Ales, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 1, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/01/sports/
ncaafootball/beer-here-the-merchandising-of-college-sports-leads-to-team-brandedales.html [https://perma.cc/GD5R-6757].
6
See Mark A. Lemley & Mark McKenna, Irrelevant Confusion, 62 STAN. L. REV. 413,
420–21 (2010) (discussing “Stealing Stanford” and “Felicity” examples).
7
See id.
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be getting more common. As the biggest universities
bring in growing sums of money through licensing
deals that rely on their brands, some are becoming
increasingly aggressive in their efforts to protect
their symbols.8
The difficulty with the claims made about university trademark
bullies is that they are anecdotal. There seems to be something going
on, but what? The scholarly literature provides no clear answer. A
trademark bully was once defined by the PTO as “a trademark owner
that uses its trademark rights to harass and intimidate another business beyond what the law might be reasonably interpreted to allow.”9 Yet how can one assess whether a particular university is
truly bullying, when there are entirely legitimate reasons for universities—like all trademark holders—to assert their rights? Online
“rankings” of trademark bullies have obscure methodologies. We
8

See Collin Binkley, Trademark Bullies? Many Big Colleges Fiercely Protect Brands,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Aug. 28, 2018), https://www.apnews.com/c23ab691c80a49c7ac94
0d4611e5d6c6 [https://perma.cc/R9QF-LGSH].
9
U.S. DEP’T OF COM., REPORT TO CONGRESS: TRADEMARK LITIGATION TACTICS AND
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT SERVICES TO PROTECT TRADEMARKS AND PREVENT
COUNTERFEITING 15, n.51 (2011), available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/
files/trademarks/notices/TrademarkLitigationStudy.pdf [https://perma.cc/E7QM-U2V2]
[hereinafter “REPORT TO CONGRESS”]. There is an ironic backstory to the definition.
Senator Leahy of Vermont was outraged when Monster Energy drinks opposed an
application for the mark “Vermonster” for beer. He asked the PTO to investigate the
practice of trademark bullying. See id. at 1. The PTO then used the definition we quote
above in a request for comments about the prevalence of bullying. In the final report,
however, the PTO later decided (we are not saying “was bullied”) to soften the language
considerably. See id. at 15 n.51.
It is noted that in USPTO’s request for comments posted on October 6, 2010,
the term “bullies” was used and described as “a trademark owner that uses its
trademark rights to harass ad [sic] intimidate another business beyond what the
law might be reasonably interpreted to allow.” The posting was later amended
to remove the terminology “bullies” and “bullying,” as it was determined that
it was more appropriate to use the language appearing in the Trademark
Technical and Conforming Amendment Act of 2010, namely, “litigation
tactics.”
See id. The idea that this chain of events might seem to confirm the existence of a problem
appears not to have occurred to those involved. Assessment of the PTO’s report was
scathing. See, e.g., Eric Goldman, Department of Commerce Releases Worthless Report on
Trademark Bullying, TECH. & MKTG. L. BLOG (Apr. 29, 2011),
https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2011/04/department_of_c.htm
[https://perma.cc/BWH9-55AG].
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lack both an empirical account of major aspects of the landscape,
and a rigorous case study giving individualized information about
what the accused bullies think they are doing. What are their legal
arguments and how would impartial experts assess those claims?
What is their intellectual property worldview—their idea of the role
that trademarks have in the university’s mission?
In this Article, we attempt to provide an answer to some of those
questions. We conducted the first multi-year empirical study of a
prominent university’s trademark assertion practice—both the legitimate exercise and defense of its brands and conduct that strays over
the line into bullying. To do so, we took the university popularly
identified as the number one collegiate trademark bully 10 and conducted a comparative empirical ranking of its behavior as compared
to other classes of universities—academically elite institutions, major sports programs, and so on—to find out if any of these categories
were predictors of aggressive trademark assertion. Second, we handcoded every trademark opposition filed by the alleged bully over a
four-year period, assigning each one a numerical merit score. We
also analyzed the arguments which the university provided, thus allowing us not merely to identify whether this was a true case of bullying, but what the alleged bully had to say for itself. Unfortunately,
and we say this with no pleasure, the alleged bully is our own university, Duke.
As this Article will show, Duke is an outlier. Its level of aggression, both in number of claims and the extremity of its legal arguments, is remarkable. Outliers are a poor basis for generalizations
about a field. On the other hand, we saw some evidence in our study
that Duke might be a front-runner rather than a mere statistical
anomaly; its behavior today suggesting the way that other universities may act in the future. While Duke’s aggressive trademark opposition practice has no peer, several other universities have begun
to move in the same direction. What is more, Duke’s arguments and
the worldview they represent—gleaned from hundreds of legal filings—seem to represent a trend in universities’ thinking about
10

See Year 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017 Biggest Bullies, TRADEMARKIA,
https://www.trademarkia.com/opposition/bully-duke-university?fn=Duke+University
[https://perma.cc/3B8H-SKYK] [hereinafter Biggest Bullies].
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trademarks and their relationship to the role of a university in today’s world. The latter finding is perhaps the most disturbing one.
The Article begins with two empirical studies, one comparative
and one merit-based, that provide a more structured and replicable
assessment of trademark bullying. In the process, the Article assesses the trademark assertiveness of three different universitybased categories: (i) the top ten academically ranked schools; (ii) the
top ten university athletic programs in terms of revenue or valuation
of their athletic program, and (iii) the top ten schools in terms of
basketball revenue.11 Part II then moves to the substance of the arguments put forward to justify Duke’s particular trademark assertions, seeking to identify the assumptions behind them and the vision of the university’s role and mission they offer. Is Duke an outlier or a bellwether? Part III assesses a variety of possible explanations for anomalous aggressiveness in trademark assertion, ranging
from legal change to behavioral economics, and the Article concludes with some suggestions for reform—both of the law and of
university practices.
I.
A CASE STUDY IN TRADEMARK BULLYING
Duke University, where the authors of this Article teach, appears
in many lists of rankings. The undergraduate university is #12 on
the US News and World Reports list.12 The law school is also #12.13
The men’s basketball team is perennially close to #1. 14 So it might
not be a surprise when, from 2014-2017, Duke came in each year at
#2 nationally in yet another ranking. Unfortunately, the category
11

The sources of these rankings are discussed infra Part I.
2021 Best National University Rankings, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT (Sept. 2020),
https://www.usnews.com/best-colleges/rankings/national-universities
[https://perma.cc/ZL3C-VSJ2].
13
2021 Best Law Schools, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT (Sept. 2020),
https://www.usnews.com/best-graduate-schools/top-law-schools/law-rankings
[https://perma.cc/RK7P-P6WR].
14
As of November 2019, the Duke men’s basketball team had been ranked No. 1 in the
Associated Press poll for 143 weeks all-time. Since this sounds like mere bragging, we
wish to insist that this statistic was inserted only because of the laudable concern that the
editors of this law journal have for punctilious accuracy. See, e.g., Men’s Basketball AP
Poll, USA TODAY (Nov. 25, 2019), https://www.usatoday.com/sports/ncaab/polls/appoll/2019-2020/2019-11-25/ [https://perma.cc/62WY-Y3J4].
12
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was not academic or athletic excellence: Duke was named the #2
“trademark bully” in the United States by the search engine Trademarkia, second only to the famously litigious Monster Energy franchise.15 This is not just a ranking of universities. Duke was named
the #2 bully out of all trademark owners. As we mention above, a
trademark bully was once defined by the PTO as “a trademark owner
that uses its trademark rights to harass and intimidate another business beyond what the law might be reasonably interpreted to allow.”16 Happily, Duke has slipped a little on that list—it was only
#7 amongst trademark bullies nationally in 2018.17 So, why would
a university be a trademark bully?
We came to this issue as skeptics. On the intellectual property
issues we knew about, Duke seemed respectful of the boundary between legitimate and illegitimate assertions of rights. True, there
were many reports about Duke being a trademark bully.18 There
15

Biggest Bullies, supra note 10. To find the listing for the relevant year, use the “Year
of” drop-down menu.
16
See REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 9.
17
Year
2018
Biggest
Bullies,
TRADEMARKIA,
https://www.trademarkia.com/opposition/bully-duke-university?fn=Duke+University
[https://perma.cc/3B8H-SKYK]. In 2019, Duke was #8 on Trademarkia’s biggest bullies
list. Id. However, the fall may not be because Duke is less assertive, but because other
trademark holders are more so. In 2015, Duke filed twenty-three oppositions and was
ranked as the #2 trademark bully. In 2018, Duke filed thirty oppositions and was ranked as
#7 on the bullies list. In 2019, it filed thirty-one and was ranked at #8. 2019 is not part of
our study, but the quality of the oppositions seems comparable to the period we looked at.
18
See, e.g., Bill Donahue, How NCAA March Madness Schools Protect Their
Trademarks, LAW 360 (Mar. 20, 2019), https://www.law360.com/articles/1140684/howncaa-march-madness-schools-protect-their-trademarks
[https://perma.cc/2UEG-R42S]
(“In the year since the 2018 tournament ended, the Blue Devils have filed a whopping 33
new cases at TTAB over applications for trademarks involving ‘Duke,’ ‘Blue’ or
‘Devil’…That rate of new cases is exceptional: No other big school has filed more than a
handful of cases over the past year. But it’s old hat for Duke, which is known as a litigious
trademark owner.”); Erik Pelton, Is Duke University a Champion Trademark Bully?
PELTON BLOG (Apr. 6, 2015), https://www.erikpelton.com/is-duke-university-championtrademark-bully/ [https://perma.cc/85UY-2CAN] (“I don’t throw around the phrase
‘trademark bully’ lightly. But to me there is no question that Duke is arguably in that
category.”); Bill McCarthy, ‘One of the most visible brand names’: University Has Already
Filed 6 Trademark Oppositions This Year, THE CHRONICLE (Mar. 14, 2018, 7:24 AM),
https://www.dukechronicle.com/article/2018/03/one-of-the-most-visible-brand-namesuniversity-has-already-filed-6-trademark-oppositions-this-year [https://perma.cc/R78Y4Z43] (discussing Duke’s opposition practices in Duke’s university newspaper); Steve
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were still puzzling stories about Duke’s trademark oppositions.19
But that left us with a war of competing anecdotes and opaque online
rankings, countered by robust defenses from those in charge of licensing at the university. The AP story quotes the Duke official responsible; “‘We find it’s much easier to proactively prevent confusion than to cure it after it happens,’ said Jim Wilkerson, the school’s
director of trademark licensing.”20 The Duke Chronicle recently ran
a story about Duke’s trademark oppositions which included a similar defense:
Michael Schoenfeld, vice president of public affairs
and government relations…explained that the Office
of General Counsel is always working to protect the
school’s name, logo and brand…“Duke is one of the
most visible brand names in higher education,”
Schoenfeld wrote in an email. “The University vigorously defends our trademarks and other legal protections to avoid confusion in the public and to ensure that Duke’s name and images are protected from
misuse.”21
How can one know if a university is a trademark bully? There
are two obstacles to answering the question. First, trademark owners
have entirely legitimate reasons to challenge conduct infringing
their marks. Trademarks may be central to a company’s worth and

Brachmann, College, University Trademark Enforcement Campaigns Not a New
Phenomenon,
IP
WATCHDOG
(Sept.
25,
2018),
https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/09/25/college-university-trademark-enforcementcampaigns-are-not-new-phenomenon-says-trademark-attorney/id=101443
[https://perma.cc/57XW-KAET] (“[T]he most active academic institution in terms of
trademark enforcement efforts might be Duke University….”).
19
In 2014, Duke’s trademark practices made national news after Duke opposed an
application by the heirs of John Wayne, whose nickname was “Duke,” to register “Duke”
for “alcoholic beverages except beers, all in connection with indicia denoting the late
internationally known movie star John Wayne, who is also known as Duke.” DUKE,
Registration No. 5,161,307; see also Gail Sullivan, John Wayne and Duke University in
Dispute over ‘Duke’ Bourbon, THE WASHINGTON POST (July 10, 2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2014/07/10/john-wayne-andduke-university-in-dispute-over-duke-bourbon/ [https://perma.cc/7G56-NB9B]. Wayne’s
heirs were eventually able to register the mark with minor changes.
20
Binkley, supra note 8.
21
McCarthy, supra note 18.
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brand recognition, a central component of its marketing strategy.
Second, trademark owners rightly point out that, if they wish to
maintain those marks, they are actually required to assert their
rights. Continued use is a requirement for trademark protection:
while acquiescence to infringing behavior may not be enough to
meet abandonment’s high standard, if a court finds clear and convincing evidence of abandonment—generally intentional abandonment—then loss of a trademark could result. 22 However, this requirement is often used to justify aggressive behavior that the law
neither requires nor supports. Trademark law only requires policing
the actual boundaries of the mark, not speculative claims far afield
from it.23 Duke could put its trademarks at risk if it remained silent
in the face of someone starting a Duke College of Medicine, or a
Blue Devil basketball camp. It would not do so by acquiescing in
the registration of “The Dude Diet” for a diet-related website. To let
that pass is not abandonment, it is simply refraining from abuse. The
actual risks of abandonment turn out to be exaggerated. 24 Yet, all
this merely restates the question. Was Duke legitimately asserting
its rights or going beyond the legitimate defense of its mark into
bullying? Abstract analysis could not reliably distinguish one from
the other.
In addition, the methodologies for the online bullying rankings
are not clearly explained. For example, one cannot simply use the
number of oppositions to measure bullying. Trademark oppositions
can be justified. Well-known brands might have more potential imitators and thus a larger stake in policing the boundaries of their
marks. To the extent that Duke was aggressively asserting its rights,
22

15 U.S.C. § 1127; 3 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND
UNFAIR COMPETITION § 17.17 (5th ed. 2020).
23
“The owner of a mark is not required to police every conceivably related use thereby
needlessly reducing non-competing commercial activity and encouraging litigation in
order to protect a definable area of primary importance.” Playboy Enters., Inc. v.
Chuckleberry Pub., Inc., 486 F. Supp. 414, 422–23 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
24
See Jessica Kiser, To Bully or Not to Bully: Understanding the Role of Uncertainty in
Trademark Enforcement Decisions, 37 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 212, 229 (2014) (“While
trademark owners routinely cite the duty to police as justification for their bully-like
behavior, the actual risk of losing one’s trademark rights due to a failure to police third
party trademark use appears to be highly exaggerated. In the majority of cases in which a
failure to police third party trademark usage is alleged, courts find that any such failure has
not risen to the level of abandonment of the mark and thus is inconsequential.”).
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perhaps the difference in behavior was explained by endogenous
variables such as Duke’s academic prestige or the athletic excellence of its sports teams.
With all that in mind, we decided to bring more rigor to the question of determining whether a university is a trademark bully by
studying it empirically. Whatever the result, we assumed, we would
learn a lot about the contemporary world of academic brands, and
the boundaries of trademark law as seen from a licensing office.
Since trademark bullies are accused of not only abusing the legal
system, but of causing harms to legitimate speech and economic
competition,25 this promised to have wider significance than the
malfeasance or innocence of an individual school. What’s more, because the oppositions or cancellations must be publicly filed, we
could determine exactly what kinds of legal claims an alleged university trademark bully was making. That would offer some valuable insights about the boundaries of trademark law as seen by its
most conspicuous users and consumers. In other words, whatever
the result of the bullying inquiry, Duke would be a fascinating test
case.
As a result, we conducted the first empirical study of a university’s trademark assertion practice—both the legitimate exercise and
defense of its brands and conduct that strays over the line into bullying. Our empirical study had two parts: (1) a comparative ranking
of Duke against other schools (the “Comparative Study”) and (2) a
hand-coding of the legal merit of the positions that Duke took and
the arguments that it made (the “Merit Study”). For the Comparative
Study, taking a four-year period from 2015-2018, we compared the
number of trademark oppositions that Duke initiated to those of similarly situated schools on a number of dimensions. For the Merit
Study, we coded every trademark opposition or cancellation raised
by Duke over the same period, assigning each one a numerical score
based on its legal merit.
25

See generally id.; Stacey Dogan, Bullying and Opportunism in Trademark and Rightof-Publicity Law, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1293 (2016); Leah Chan Grinvald, Shaming Trademark
Bullies, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 625 (2011); William T. Gallagher, Trademark and Copyright
Enforcement in the Shadow of IP Law, 28 SANTA CLARA COMPUT. & HIGH TECH. L.J. 453
(2012); 2 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
§ 17.17 (5th ed. 2020).
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In both cases, our focus was on trademark oppositions: the process in front of the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (“TTAB”)
where trademark owners can oppose applications for federal trademark registration by other entities. This step happens only after an
examiner has already approved the potential mark for publication,
meaning that the most problematic or confusing marks have already
been weeded out. If someone attempted to register “Niky” for athletic shoes, or “Dook Blu Devils” for basketball apparel, the examiner would almost certainly deny the mark at an earlier stage. However, if the registration got to the point of publication, Nike and
Duke could file an opposition if the registration was pending, or a
cancellation if the registration has been granted. 26
Why focus on trademark oppositions and cancellations? Normally we are consumers rather than producers of empirical scholarship. We had teasingly mocked other empirical studies for their tendency to look for the lost car keys only under the light of the lamppost. Yet we found ourselves eager to defend the little patch of pavement under our own lamppost. How the sidewalk shone!
Nevertheless, there are good reasons to focus on that patch of
pavement. First, the phrase “trademark bully” is traditionally associated with trademark oppositions; it was in that context that the
phrase was developed. Second, trademark oppositions are public
documents with (ostensible) reasons provided within them. In this
Article, we will describe other stories of trademark overreach, but
those stories come with no requirement of a formal, public statement
of legal reasoning. With oppositions and cancellations, however, the
opposing party must state a legal argument. Thus, one could not
merely count events, one could classify reasoning. If Duke were to
be abusing trademark law, we would effectively be able to go inside
the mind of a trademark bully. We might be able to understand and
to dissect its legal consciousness in a way that promised to have
26

This point deserves considerable emphasis: these oppositions or cancellations only
occur after the PTO’s examiner has already approved a mark for publication, having
checked to see if it is so similar to an existing mark as to create a likelihood of confusion,
and thus should be refused registration under 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d). For an entity to be
opposing marks at a high rate thus indicates either an understanding of the boundaries of
trademark law very different than the PTO’s, or a belief that the PTO routinely commits
errors in applying the law, or both.
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general significance beyond the parochial question of one university’s conduct. Finally, in Duke’s case, there were many oppositions, over multiple years, and each of them cost money. Talk is
cheap—but lawyer-talk, let alone lawyer-talk in an official proceeding, is not. These were (i) expensive and thus presumably (ii) carefully considered (iii) reasoned legal arguments (iv) provided in the
context of a formal proceeding with associated professional norms
and ethical sanctions for misstatements. Accordingly, it seemed as
if they might provide a more revealing portrait of doctrinal and institutional positions on which a brand owner was willing to stake
money and reputation. This was not mere brand-bloviation.
There are hundreds of ways in which entities, including universities, can make overreaching trademark claims. We discuss some
of the others later in this Article. Formal oppositions probably do
not perfectly mirror that larger reality, and if they did, how would
one know? But our case study lays out a carefully considered,
expensively generated, large, and publicly stated set of views of
trademark law by a major university which is a conspicuous consumer of trademark doctrine and policy. That set of views and
actions can be compared to those of university peers and ranked—
both quantitatively and qualitatively. It is also morally consequential: a university is calling on the state to prevent other entities from
using language and symbols that are arguably in the public domain.
For those reasons, we believe it is revealing. We hope it also provides a prototype for future empirical examination of alleged bullying and brings more clarity to a debate currently dominated by
anecdote and assertion.
A. The Comparative Study
Our hypothesis in this portion of the study was that if the need
to police a trademark assiduously were related to some endogenous
variable—say, academic rank and prestige or the financial returns of
a school’s athletic programs—then similarly situated universities
would exhibit similar behavior. Thus, if one could find the relevant
comparison set, one could come up with a rating of the university’s
performance relative to the appropriate peer group. We used three
categories:
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(i) The top ten academically ranked schools, drawn from the
2018 US News and World Report survey of universities; 27
(ii) The top ten university athletic programs in terms of revenue
or valuation of their athletic program—we used NCAA data from
2016-2017 provided by USA Today. 28 Duke is not part of that
group; and
(iii) The top ten schools in terms of basketball revenue. 29
We used all three so as not to prejudge the relevant comparison
set. Perhaps academically elite schools felt more need to assert their
brands aggressively. Perhaps the billions of dollars generated by college athletics produce both abundant licensing opportunities and eager free riders who need to be beaten back by the university’s attorneys. Or perhaps there is something special about basketball, a sport
traditionally associated with Duke. Unfortunately, in each case, the
results were striking.

27

See 2018 Best National University Rankings, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT (Sept.
2017); Monikah Schuschu, The 2018 U.S News and World Report College Rankings: What
You Need to Know, COLLEGEVINE (Oct. 24, 2017), https://blog.collegevine.com/the-2018u-s-news-and-world-report-college-rankings-what-you-need-to-know/
[https://perma.cc/A4VH-5QCN].
28
See Steve Berkowitz et al., NCAA Finances, USA TODAY, https://web.archive.org/
web/20190319022759/https://sports.usatoday.com/ncaa/finances/ (on file with journal).
29
See Chris Smith, The Most Valuable College Basketball Teams, FORBES (Mar. 12,
2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/chrissmith/2019/03/12/the-most-valuable-collegebasketball-teams/ [https://perma.cc/BR78-XDMC].
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Total Oppositions & Cancellations 2015-2018
Top 10 Schools Academically

The thesis that academically highly-ranked schools would exhibit similar behavior was clearly falsified. Duke filed 136 proceedings over the period 2015-2018. By comparison, the remaining
schools in the top ten list, combined, filed a total of seven. What’s
more, examination of those oppositions indicated that they were
generally modest and grounded in existing law. Duke’s behavior,
then, could not be explained by its academic prestige.
Next, we looked at the top ten schools in terms of athletic revenue earned, as measured by the NCAA’s required financial disclosures for 2016-2017.
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Total Oppositions & Cancellations 2015-2018
Top 10 by 2016-17 Athletic Revenues (plus Duke) 30

Here, for the first time, we saw some evidence of correlation between ranking and the aggressiveness of trademark assertion. However, even here, Duke was an outlier. Texas, at thirty oppositions,
was itself unusual, with the closest counterpart being Ohio State at
eleven. Duke’s 136 oppositions again dwarfed its potential comparison schools. Excluding Duke, the mean was 6.8. Duke thus filed
exactly twenty times as many oppositions as the mean for this group.
Indeed, Duke filed more than twice as many oppositions as all of the
other schools combined. This is remarkable given the amount of
money those top ten schools were earning. Texas’s athletic programs, ranked 1st, earned $214,830,647 in 2016-2017. Duke’s numbers were not given in USA Today’s list, but for the 2015-2016
30

Berkowitz et al., supra note 28. However, we also looked at a larger set of schools
and at different data about football programs alone, in case those affected the result. The
same pattern was revealed.
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season, Duke reported earning $91,971,836 and it was 37th in that
year’s rankings.31 Thus it seems that there is an association between
large athletic programs and trademark assertiveness, but that the association is a loose one, with wide variability in behavior. Duke remains an outlier.
Next, we turned to a comparison with the ten most economically
valuable basketball programs, in case something about that sport
produced unusual behavior in either licensing or free-riding. 32
Again, Duke was a remarkable outlier, filing 8.5 times as many oppositions as the next school on the list—Kentucky.

31

NCAA Division I-FBS Athletic Department Revenues, CARDINAL AUTHORITY (Mar.
10,
2017),
https://247sports.com/college/louisville/Board/103994/Contents/NCAADivision-I-FBS-Athletic-Department-Revenues-54677701/
[https://perma.cc/V6H74A97].
32
The list was based on a ranking compiled by Forbes Magazine that covers a similar
period to that of our study. It has some oddities to a basketball fan’s eyes—financial success
and success on the court are not always correlated. Booster donations play a big role.
However, the top ten list we extracted from Forbes’ data does include three of the five
NCAA men’s basketball champions from 2014-2018: Connecticut (2014), Duke (2015)
and Louisville (2016). The winners in 2017 (UNC, #11 on the Forbes list) and 2018
(Villanova, unranked) also had low rates of opposition. The methodology of the study is
described thus: “Our ranking of college basketball’s most-valuable teams is based on threeyear average revenues across the 2014-15, 2015-16 and 2016-17 seasons (ties in revenue
were broken using average profits). To determine team revenues and expenses, we relied
on annual filings made by each school’s athletic department to the NCAA and the
Department of Education. We also made adjustments to individual line items like
contributions, media rights, and sponsorships to adjust for differences in accounting
practices among athletic departments. (The three private schools on our list—Duke,
Syracuse and Marquette—declined to share financial details beyond those published by the
Department of Education.)” Smith, supra note 29.
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Total Oppositions & Cancellations 2015-2018
Top 10 Most Valuable Basketball Programs

In short, whatever the comparison set, Duke’s aggressiveness in
policing its marks is strikingly anomalous. If we added together all
schools on all three of our lists—Ohio State appears twice and was
not double-counted—Duke is still filing 39% more oppositions than
the other schools in all three categories combined: 136 to 98. Duke
may indeed be “one of the most visible brand names in higher education” but it is hardly more visible than Harvard, Yale, Stanford,
MIT, Princeton, Texas, Alabama, Michigan, LSU, Kentucky, Ohio
State, Auburn, and sixteen others put together. The non-Duke mean
number of oppositions during our study period for academically
elite schools was 0.7, for top athletic schools, 6.8, and for top basketball schools, 3.78. We can see a few other universities beginning
to assert their marks aggressively. For example, the University of
Texas filed 4.4 times as many oppositions as the mean for its group.
Nevertheless, Duke’s lead was unchallenged.
B. The Merit Study
1. Background
The Comparative Study focused on raw numbers. Nevertheless,
at the end of the day, this study shows only that Duke is an outlier.
It does not show that Duke was incorrect in its actions, though it
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casts doubt on that idea. It is possible that Duke is right about the
optimal level of assertion of its marks, and that the other twentyeight universities we looked at, all of whom have sophisticated lawyers and engage actively in trademark licensing, are in error. In order to assess that possibility, we hand-coded every trademark opposition or cancellation raised by Duke over the period 2015-2018 and
assigned each one a numerical score based on its legal merit.
In the process, we gathered a great deal of information in our
larger project, one that goes beyond Duke to the questions about
universities and intellectual property raised in the introduction.
Duke is a conspicuous consumer and user of trademark law: how
has such an entity come to understand the boundaries of these intellectual property rights? What arguments does it make? What is the
“vision” underlying its actions? How does it see its role as a university in the production and delivery of trademarked goods and services? What relationship does that role play to the traditional one of
a university? How do its actions play into the so-called “permissions
culture”33—the practice of asserting intellectual property rights going far beyond existing legal doctrine? In other areas, scholars claim
that these practices, if they become pervasive, are capable of transforming a field of culture (for example, copyright holders attempting
to minimize or eliminate fair use) or science (for example, patent
trolls using illegitimate patent claims to extract unearned rents) even
though the practices have no legal foundation. Could that be true
here? These are questions of substantially greater reach and importance than the question of whether Duke is guilty or innocent of
bullying.
Oppositions are the processes in front of the TTAB where trademark owners can oppose applications for Federal trademark

33

See LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE
LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY 8, 99, 192–93 (2004); KEITH
AOKI, JAMES BOYLE, AND JENNIFER JENKINS, TALES FROM THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: BOUND BY
LAW? (2006) (exploring the permissions culture in documentary film); KEMBREW MCLEOD
& PETER DICOLA, CREATIVE LICENSE: THE LAW AND CULTURE OF DIGITAL SAMPLING 98–
99, 119–20 (2011) (examining the pervasive permissions culture in digital sampling).
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registration.34 As we noted earlier, these proceedings only occur after the PTO’s examiner has already approved a mark for publication,
having checked to see if it is too similar to existing marks or should
be denied for other reasons. The examining attorney is not always
correct. If someone is trying to register “Cameron Krzyz” for imprinting on apparel (the trademarked nickname for Duke basketball
fans is “Cameron Crazies”), Duke has every right to oppose that registration.35 It did so, entirely justifiably. In fact, it is required to oppose potentially infringing marks under some circumstances if it
wishes to preserve its own marks, though, as we pointed out earlier,
trademark owners often overstate how far the law requires them to
go in policing their mark.
But oppositions can also verge on the frivolous: Duke opposed
“Pretty Devil” for electronic slot machines (Duke’s sports teams are
called “Blue Devils”).36 It opposed “Blue Ball Chiller” for alcoholic
beverages and “Get Your Blue On!” for charitable fundraising.37
You might think that a “Do Your Dooty!!—Major Duke” design of
a saluting soldier seated on a toilet as a trademark for toilet deodorant and a toilet footstool, was at worst, in poor taste.38 Duke opposed
it, as it did “Geek’d” for clothing items, “Beach’d” for beach bags
and cosmetic bags, “i-D” for providing travel, health, and fashion
information, “D’Grill” for barbecue smokers and grills, and “Bluefood” for various food products.39

34

15 U.S.C. § 1063; U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, TRADEMARK MANUAL OF
EXAMINING
PROCEDURE
§
1503.01
(Oct.
2018),
available
at
https://tmep.uspto.gov/RDMS/TMEP/current#/current/TMEP-1500d1e181.html
[https://perma.cc/V654-349K].
35
CAMERON KRZYZ, Opp’n No. 91,229,209 (filed July 27, 2016).
36
PRETTY DEVIL, Opp’n No. 91,222,305 (filed June 10, 2015).
37
BLUE BALL CHILLER, Opp’n No. 91,220,755 (filed Feb. 23, 2015); GET YOUR
BLUE ON!, Opp’n No. 91,225,159 (filed Dec. 2, 2015).
38
DO YOUR DOOTY!!—MAJOR DUKE, Opp’n No. 91,238,525 (filed Dec. 20,
2017).
39
GEEK’D, Opp’n. No. 91,233,509 (filed Mar. 21, 2017); BEACH’D, Opp’n. No.
91,234,084 (filed Apr. 19, 2017); I-D, Opp’n. No. 91,233,282 (filed Mar. 1, 2017);
D’GRILL, Opp’n. No. 91,234,213 (filed Apr. 26, 2017); BLUEFOOD, Opp’n. No.
91,235,393 (filed July 5, 2017). One of our superb research assistants pointed out that
Duke’s grounds of opposition included the fact that this mark was purely descriptive—
presumably, if the food were to be blue—and mis-descriptive, presumably if it were not.
At present, Duke does not claim a mark over “Catch 22.”
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Duke routinely opposes, or at least asks for an extension to file
a possible opposition against, marks that contain the word Duke, or
sound like Duke, regardless of the type of goods or services the
marks seek to protect. That is not the way that trademarks work. As
we will explain below, a trademark is not a right in gross over a
word, but rather a protection of a particular mark in connection with
a particular set of goods and services. More strangely still, Duke also
regularly opposes trademarks containing the word “Devil,” the word
“Blue,” or consisting of the letter “D,” standing alone, or in combination with another letter. As we will explain—under well-established principles of law—that goes beyond the bounds of reasonable
trademark assertion.
How does one judge whether a brand owner is a bully? Though
trademark owners often seem to believe otherwise, a trademark does
not convey the absolute ownership of a word or a symbol. 40 Subject
to some limitations we shall explain later, it only gives you the right
to exclude others from using confusingly similar marks in the same
area of goods and services, or one that is related. “Delta” for airlines
does not infringe “Delta” for faucets.
The fact that trademarks do not provide absolute ownership of a
word or symbol is a central feature of trademark law, not a mistake
or omission.41 As courts and academics have frequently pointed out,
40

“Trademark law serves the important functions of protecting product identification,
providing consumer information, and encouraging the production of quality goods and
services. But protections ‘against unfair competition’ cannot be transformed into ‘rights to
control language.’” Lamparello v. Falwell, 420 F.3d 309, 313 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting CPC
Int’l, Inc. v. Skippy Inc., 214 F.3d 456, 462 (4th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted)).
41
ETW Corp. v. Jireh Pub., Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 922 (6th Cir. 2003) (“[A] trademark,
unlike a copyright or patent, is not a ‘right in gross’ that enables a holder to enjoin all
reproductions.” (quoting Boston Athletic Ass’n v. Sullivan, 867 F.2d 22, 35 (1st Cir.
1989)); Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Major Mud & Chem. Co., 221 U.S.P.Q. 1191 (T.T.A.B.
1984), aff’d, 765 F.2d 161 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (“[R]ecognizing a right in gross…is contrary
to principles of trademark law.”); see also 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 24:11 (5th ed. 2020) (“If there is no likelihood
of confusion (and in the absence of dilution), the same marks can peacefully co-exist on
different goods and services. In the author’s opinion, some well-known examples of coexistence include: UNITED airlines and UNITED van lines, EAGLE shirts, EAGLE
pencils, EAGLE pretzels, EAGLE brand condensed milk, CHAMPION spark plugs and
CHAMPION sportswear, DELTA airlines, DELTA dental insurance and DELTA faucets,
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the primary goal of trademark law is informational efficiency—efficient communication between consumers and producers. 42 On the
consumer side, I can decide what soap or detergent I like and, thereafter, can continue to purchase that brand knowing what I will get.
If anyone could call their soap “Ivory” or their detergent “Palmolive,” would I have to scrutinize the label each time to make sure the
ingredients were the same? From an economic point of view, that
would be very inefficient. In other words, the economic rationale for
the “Ivory” trademark is not that Ivory has labored hard to build it
up and advertise it.43 Nor is it that, without trademark protection,
other soap companies could use the same name and “reap where they
had not sown.”44 Instead, the law focuses on the benefits to the consumer of stable nomenclature and thus the social gains produced by
efficient information flow in the market. From the point of view of
the producer, the existence of trademark protection gives an
ACE retail hardware stores and ACE bandages, TROPICANA Las Vegas hotel and
TROPICANA orange juice, The DOW stock market index and DOW chemical company,
DELL computers and DELL magazines.”).
42
See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 164 (1995) (“[T]rademark
law, by preventing others from copying a source-identifying mark, ‘reduce[s] the
customer’s costs of shopping and making purchasing decisions,’ for it quickly and easily
assures a potential customer that this item—the item with this mark—is made by the same
producer as other similarly marked items that he or she liked (or disliked) in the past. At
the same time, the law helps assure a producer that it (and not an imitating competitor) will
reap the financial, reputation-related rewards associated with a desirable product. The law
‘encourage[s] the production of quality products,’ and simultaneously discourages those
who hope to sell inferior products by capitalizing on a consumer’s inability quickly to
evaluate the quality of an item offered for sale.” (citations omitted)); Virgin v. Nawab, 335
F.3d 141, 147 (2d. Cir 2005) (“The paramount objective of the trademark law is to avoid
confusion in the marketplace. The purpose for which the trademark law accords merchants
the exclusive right to the use of a name or symbol in their area or commerce is
identification, so that the merchants can establish goodwill for their goods based on past
satisfactory performance, and the consuming public can rely on a mark as a guarantee that
the goods or services so marked come from the merchant who has been found to be
satisfactory in the past.” (citations omitted)); see also William M. Landes & Richard A.
Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON. 265, 270 (1987).
43
See Smith v. Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d 562, 568 (9th Cir. 1968) (“A large expenditure of
money does not in itself create legally protectable rights…By taking his ‘free ride,’ the
copyist, albeit unintentionally, serves an important public interest by offering comparable
goods at lower prices.”).
44
See TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 29 (2001) (“[C]opying
is not always discouraged or disfavored by the laws which preserve our competitive
economy. Allowing competitors to copy will have salutary effects in many instances.”).
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incentive to invest in building up a stable brand identity, whether it
is “cheap but acceptable,” “edgy fashion for skaters and stoners,”
“the acme of luxury,” or anything in between. The trademark functions, then, as a semantic handshake between producer and consumer.
This explanation leads naturally to the limits of the trademark.
“Ivory” for soap would be infringed by “Ivorie” Soap. But it is not
infringed by “Ivory Coast” for women’s fashion, or “Ivory” for
barbeque sauce, information technology, wealth management, or
any of the scores of other registered marks that use the word “Ivory”
for different goods and services. “Ivory” is a useful term—it can
connote beauty or style, a particular coast, a color, academia (“Ivory
Tower”), a level of luxury (to those who can ignore how the ivory
is procured), a contrast (“Ebony and Ivory”), and many other things.
Trademark law seeks to simplify the informational choices of the
consumer, but it also seeks to protect the public domain of valuable
semantic symbols for future trademark users, operating in different
areas of goods and services.45 To allow the first-comer to monopolize all possible uses of a word or symbol could be as harmful to
both producers and consumers as allowing infringing uses in the
same area of goods or services. This is a point that bears reiterating:
allowing absolutist claims—based on potential future uses without
real basis in fact—would produce significant social costs.

45

See KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 122
(2004) (“The common law’s tolerance of a certain degree of confusion on the part of
consumers followed from the very fact that in cases like this one an originally descriptive
term was selected to be used as a mark, not to mention the undesirability of allowing
anyone to obtain a complete monopoly on use of a descriptive term simply by grabbing it
first…[T]here being no indication that the [Lanham Act] was meant to deprive commercial
speakers of the ordinary utility of descriptive words. ‘If any confusion results, that is a risk
the plaintiff accepted when it decided to identify its product with a mark that uses a wellknown descriptive phrase.’”); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205,
213 (2000) (“Consumers should not be deprived of the benefits of competition with regard
to the utilitarian and esthetic purposes that product design ordinarily serves by a rule of law
that facilitates plausible threats of suit against new entrants based upon alleged inherent
distinctiveness.”); Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir.
1976) (“[N]o matter how much money and effort the user of a generic term has poured into
promoting the sale of its merchandise and what success it has achieved in securing public
identification, it cannot deprive competing manufacturers of the product of the right to call
an article by its name.”).
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The point that there are multiple uses of a word or symbol applies directly to our study. What is true of the word “Ivory” is also
true of the word “Duke.” Duke can refer to the university in North
Carolina. But it could also refer to a particular title of nobility, the
connotation of someone eminent in a field, a slang term for fists or
for a fight, a cultivated hybrid of sweet and sour cherries, a cider
apple (the Duke of Devonshire), the nickname of the actor John
Wayne, or the surname “Duke” possessed by some individual with
no connection to Duke’s founders. The list of Duke marks on the
following page makes this point clear.
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Federally Registered “Duke” Marks Not Owned by
Duke University46

46

This list is current as of February 17, 2021.

415

416

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXXI:387

Notice that Duke University coexists with registered marks for
“Duke’s” for mayonnaise and other condiments, “Duke” for kitchen
equipment, “Duke Kahanamoku” for swim suits (referring to the
legendary Hawaiian surfer and Olympic gold medal winner), the
“The Duke of New York” for entertainment services, “Duke Energy” for the power company, “Put Up Your Dukes” for sports
gloves and mitts, and many, many more.47 In fact, as the display on
the previous page shows, there are 193 registered marks that include
the word “Duke” that have nothing to do with Duke University. This
is not a matter of trademark law failing. It is a result of trademark
law working.
With some exceptions, infringement turns on a multi-part analysis of whether there is likelihood of confusion given a range of factors including the similarity of the marks, the strength of the senior
mark, the proximity of the goods and services, and so on.48 There
are also special protections for “famous” marks—a term of art we
will explain later. However, to reiterate, Duke University does not
own the word “Duke.” Still less does it own the letter “D.” It does
not own the word “Devil.” Duke also does not own the word “Blue,”
even though Duke’s sports teams are called the Blue Devils. Yet
Duke often acts as if it had an absolute property right in each of these
words and symbols, routinely filing oppositions when any of them
appear in a trademark application. Our study shows, sadly, that those
oppositions are mostly incorrect as a matter of law.

47

See DUKE’S, Registration No. 4,005,468 (“Duke’s” mayonnaise); DUKE,
Registration No. 274,575 (“Duke” kitchen equipment); DUKE KAHANAMOKU,
Registration No. 1,019,452 (“Duke Kahanamoku” swim suits); THE DUKE OF NEW
YORK, Registration No. 5,389,258 (“The Duke of New York” entertainment); DUKE
ENERGY, Registration No. 2,316,855; PUT UP YOUR DUKES, Registration No.
5,467,313 (“Put Up Your Dukes” sports gloves). In many cases, there are multiple
registrations for these marks.
48
15 U.S.C. § 1114 (regarding registered marks infringed by uses that are “likely to
cause confusion”); 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (regarding unregistered marks infringed by uses
that are “likely to cause confusion”); In re E.I. DuPont DeNemours & Co., 476 F.2d
1357 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (listing exemplary factors for proving likelihood of confusion).
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2. Methodology
We hand-coded every opposition that Duke has filed from 20152018. Appendix A describes our methodology. Our conclusions are
simple. There are definitely cases in which Duke was justified in
opposing other marks. Reasonable people can also differ about the
extent of trademark protection. However, even though we assume
that every action here was taken in good faith, and even considering
Duke’s claims sympathetically, we found that the majority of
Duke’s oppositions over multiple years go far beyond the boundaries of existing law.
From 2015-2018, Duke filed 133 oppositions and three cancellations—a challenge to a mark already issued. 49 For convenience
sake, we will generally refer to them all as oppositions. It also filed
hundreds of requests for extensions of time to file oppositions, some
of which were later converted into actual oppositions. These are
more significant than they might appear, because the mere indication that there might be an opposition may be enough to persuade
those attempting to register to abandon their application. Thus, it is
possible that we are undercounting the effects of Duke’s trademark
assertion practice. We focused only on the actual oppositions and
cancellations, however, and coded them on the following four-point
scale:
49

Some context might be useful here. Professor Barton Beebe was kind enough to share
with us his curated data set of trademarks. His figures show i.) that oppositions are very
rare and ii.) that they dramatically affect the rate of abandonment of applications. Focusing
on the five-year period from 2011 through 2015 he found that, “of the 516,679 use-based
applications that were published during this period, 506,765 met with no opposition. Of
these, 10,721 (or 2.1%) failed to register. In other words, a very small proportion of
published applications that are not opposed are then abandoned. Of the 9,914 use-based
applications that were opposed, only 38.4% managed to register.” E-mail from Barton
Beebe, Professor of Law, N.Y.U. Sch. of Law, to James Boyle, Professor of Law, Duke
Law Sch. (on file with author). This data is not exactly comparable to ours – the period of
time is slightly different, and we have not yet broken out use-based applications from
intent-to-use applications, in which one would expect a higher rate of abandonment.
Nevertheless, the disparity in rate of abandonment (from 2.1% of those that were not
opposed to 61.6% of those that were) suggests that oppositions will produce a marked
increase in abandonment rates. On the other hand, the rate of abandonment after Duke’s
oppositions was still lower than the general group of marks that were opposed. Duke’s
oppositions produced an abandonment rate of 49% rather than 61.6% in the general
population. It could be that this reflects the low quality of Duke’s oppositions, but the data
cannot demonstrate this one way or the other.
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1) Clearly Erroneous: completely ungrounded as a matter of existing law.
2) Far-fetched: unlikely to prevail.
3) Arguable: existing trademark doctrine presents reasons why
the application might, or might not, succeed, but Duke has some
good arguments.
4) Sound: the opposition was well-grounded in existing trademark law and Duke would prevail were the matter to be litigated.
3. Results
After conducting an individual legal analysis of each of Duke’s
oppositions or cancellations, the overall coding for 2015-2018 was
as follows.
1) Clearly Erroneous: 75 (55%)
2) Far-fetched: 41 (30%)
3) Arguable: 14 (10%)
4) Sound; 6 (5%)
Legal Merit Ratings
2015–2018: 136 Oppositions
"4" Sound, 6, 5%
"3" Arguable, 14, 10%

"2" Far-fetched, 41, 30%

"1" Clearly Erroneous, 75, 55%
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Thus, 85% of Duke’s oppositions were coded either clearly erroneous or far-fetched. Interestingly, had Duke only filed those
twenty “sound” or “arguable” oppositions, they would have been
closer to, though still above, the mean number of oppositions filed
during that period by universities with the top ten athletic programs
financially (6.8). To put it another way, the Comparative Study
shows that Duke is a remarkable outlier in filing oppositions and the
Merit Study suggests that the reason for that outlier status is simple:
Duke is filing many oppositions with little or no legal merit. Similarly situated universities—both in terms of academic status and athletic revenues—do not tend to file those clearly erroneous or farfetched oppositions.50 This is consistent with a “wisdom of welllawyered crowds” hypothesis, that economically rational parties
who have the resources to obtain high quality legal advice will tend
to converge on a relatively accurate assessment of the law, or at least
an accurate prediction of the actions of authoritative decision makers. We will return later to the question of why Duke is so different
from its peer group.
Our study did show some annual variation in both the number
and the validity of Duke’s oppositions during the period of the study.
The number of annual oppositions ranged from twenty-three to
forty-six. The “clearly erroneous” rating ranged from 74% in 2015
to 36% in 2018. The “sound” rating ranged from 8% in 2016 to 0%
in 2018.
What explains this variation in rating? It is of course possible,
despite our attempts to standardize and double-check the analysis,
that unobserved factors caused variations in the standard for what
50

As we mentioned at the beginning of this Article, we are concerned that this may be
changing. The University of Texas also pushes the boundaries of trademark law in
oppositions—for example, because it has a registration of a hand making a “longhorn”
symbol for decals and shirts, it appears to think it owns the design of a hand with the second
and pinky finger raised in other contexts and for unrelated goods and services. The sign, of
course, has many other meanings and variations, including “I love you” in American Sign
Language, a gesture of approbation at a heavy metal concert, a warning sign against
demonic influences (one that is actually mentioned by Bram Stoker in Dracula), or an
indication that the person gestured towards is a cuckold. See Dio’s Two-finger Gesture What
Does
It
Mean?,
BBC
NEWS
MAG.
(May
18,
2010),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/magazine/8687002.stm
[https://perma.cc/YL8AKX9P]. At present, however, Duke is still in a different league.
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counted as clearly erroneous, sound and so on, variations that our
subsequent review failed to pick up. However, if Duke adopted a
relatively algorithmic approach to oppositions—opposing the majority of marks with “Duke,” “Blue,” “Devil,” and the letter “D” regardless of context or area of trade—then two things might happen.
First, one would expect some annual variation in the number of people seeking marks featuring such words. Second, one would expect
that Duke’s standard oppositions would vary in perceived merit depending on the area of goods or services in which the putatively offending mark was sought. If random happenstance yielded the filing
of a “Duke” mark for industrial railway couplings and boat-hooks
one year51 and a “Duke” mark for hospital blankets52 the next year,
then Duke would automatically object to both, but the coding
would—rightly—assess those oppositions differently. Alternatively, temporal fluctuations might be precipitated by an external
event such as a national championship in a revenue sport. This might
encourage (illicit) freeloaders deliberately to attempt to infringe, or
tiptoe close to, Duke’s marks, joining the innocent throngs with their
“Bluefood,” “Blue Ball Chillers,” or “Devil’s Garden” alcohol who
are surprised to find Duke believes it has a right to naysay them.
While the latter oppositions would still be ungrounded, and would
be coded as such, the former would improve Duke’s coded percentages of accuracy. Finally, Duke’s trademark portfolio might change,
as it did in 2017 when Duke gained registered marks over a number
of goods on which logos might be displayed. 53 It is worth noting
that, even taking the most “generous” annual rating in 2018, 73% of
Duke’s oppositions were still rated as either clearly erroneous or farfetched.
The chart below shows the breakdown of the ratings.

51

See, e.g., DUKE, Opp’n. No. 91,230,622 (filed Oct. 12, 2016).
See, e.g., DUKE, Cancellation No. 92,064,529 (filed Sept. 27, 2016). In this case,
Duke filed a cancellation rather than an opposition.
53
DUKE, Registration No. 5,335,576; see also DUKE, Registration No. 5,472,647;
DUKE, Registration No. 5,568,287.
52
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Legal Merit Ratings

"3" Arguable, 1, 4%
"2" Far-fetched, 4, 18%

"4" Sound, 1, 4%

"4" Sound, 3, 8%
"3" Arguable, 3, 8%

"1" Clearly Erroneous, 20, 54%
"1" Clearly Erroneous, 17, 74%

2015: 23 oppositions

"3" Arguable, 2, 4%

"2" Far-fetched, 11, 30%

2016: 37 oppositions

"4" Sound, 2, 4%

"4" Sound, 0, 0%
"3" Arguable, 8, 27%
"1" Clearly Erroneous, 11, 36%

"2" Far-fetched, 15, 33%

"1" Clearly Erroneous, 27, 59%
"2" Far-fetched, 11, 37%

2017: 46 oppositions

2018: 30 oppositions

The statistics alone may not convey adequately the extent of
Duke’s oppositions or the tenuousness of some of their legal justifications. Below we give some examples.
4. Representative Examples of Over-Assertion
“Duke” marks. When Duke concludes that the applicant’s mark
comes too close to the word “Duke,” it brings not only a section 2(d)
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likelihood of confusion claim,54 but also a section 43(c) dilution
claim55 and a section 2(a) claim that the mark falsely suggests a
connection to Duke University.56 Duke brought these claims in
opposing the following marks:
“The Dude Diet” for a diet-related website
“Kuke” for electronic products
“Goluke” for clothing
“Le Duc” for food and drink services57
Duke does have well-known “Duke” trademarks for educational
services, medical services, athletic merchandise, and so on. Yet the
marks above are sufficiently different from those “Duke” marks to
make the assertion of consumer confusion frivolous.58 In addition,
as discussed below, Duke’s dilution claims are likely to fail because
its “Duke” marks seem very unlikely to meet the threshold “fame”
requirement. The section 2(a) claims are even more far-fetched. In
order to succeed, Duke must show that consumers encountering the
applicant’s mark would conclude that it “points uniquely and

54

That is, that the new mark “[c]onsists of or comprises a mark which so resembles a
mark registered in the Patent and Trademark Office, or a mark or trade name previously
used in the United States by another and not abandoned, as to be likely, when used on or
in connection with the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or
to deceive.” 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d).
55
That is, that Duke is such a nationally famous mark that it is entitled to the special
protections reserved for such marks against dilution and blurring by section 43(c) of the
Lanham Act. We discuss this claim later. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c).
56
Duke may also include other grounds for opposition that are unrelated to conflicts
with Duke’s trademarks—failure to show use, lack of distinctiveness, fraud on the PTO,
etc.—but we have not listed those here because our focus is on the breadth of Duke’s
asserted exclusivity. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a).
57
THE DUDE DIET, Opp’n No. 91,225,625 (filed Jan. 4, 2016); KUKE, Opp’n No,
91,229,916 (filed Sept. 1, 2016); GOLUKE, Opp’n No. 91,236,293 (filed Aug. 16, 2017);
LE DUC, Opp’n No. 91,226,416 (filed Jan. 27, 2016).
58
Duke also opposed “Duke’s Butt” for “[a]dult sexual stimulation aids, namely,
artificial penises, artificial vaginas.” DUKE’S BUTT, Opp’n No. 91,217,109 (filed June
11, 2014). While all of us would wish to unknow the fact that there is a market for the
artificial derrieres of imaginary aristocrats, Duke has no credible legal basis to oppose this
mark. The opposition may actually bring more attention to this otherwise hopefully
forgettable
incident.
See
Streisand
Effect,
Wikipedia,
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Streisand_effect [https://perma.cc/X3W9-TVNJ].
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unmistakably” to Duke University.59 Even when the contested mark
is exactly the same as the name of a university, this requirement has
not been met. When the University of Notre Dame opposed a cheese
importer’s registration of “Notre Dame” for cheese on section 2(a)
grounds, the Federal Circuit rejected this claim because the cheese
mark did not “point uniquely to the University.”60 And that is where
the names are identical. Any referential link between the marks
listed above and Duke University is more remote.
“Devil” marks. When opposing marks that use either the word
“Devil” or an image of a devil, Duke cites section 2(d) likelihood of
confusion grounds, and sometimes adds the section 2(a) “falsely
suggesting a connection” claim discussed above. These oppositions
are premised in part on Duke’s “Blue Devils” mark and its marks
including images of devils, but neither offers a legally tenable basis
for blocking other marks merely because they include the word
“devil,” particularly when they are used for products unrelated to
those that Duke provides. Examples of devil-based oppositions include:

“Werdo” with the above image of a devil for shirts and hats
“Devils Nightmare” for beer
“Devil’s Garden” for alcoholic beverages
“Pretty Devil” for slot machines61
59

Bos. Athletic Ass’n v. Velocity, LLC, 117 U.S.P.Q.2d 1492, 1495 (T.T.A.B. 2015).
To prevail on a section 2(a) claim, “Duke” must also be “of sufficient fame or reputation
that…a connection with the Opposer would be presumed,” but the “fame” standard is less
stringent than “fame” for purposes of dilution.
60
Univ. of Notre Dame v. J.C. Gourmet Food Imp. Co., Inc., 703 F.2d 1372, 1377 (Fed.
Cir. 1983) (noting that the court’s conclusion might have changed had Notre Dame been
able to show that the cheese importer “intended to identify the university”). Duke would
have been well-advised to bear this ruling in mind in the “Duke’s Butt” opposition
described earlier, a mark which, unlike the cheese, was not exactly the same as the
university’s name.
61
WERDO, Opp’n No. 91,241,792 (filed June 13, 2018); DEVILS NIGHTMARE,
Opp’n No. 91,227,202 (filed Apr. 4, 2016); DEVIL’S GARDEN, Opp’n No. 91,234,089
(filed Apr. 19, 2017); PRETTY DEVIL, Opp’n No. 91,222,305 (filed June 10, 2015).
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“D” and “Blue.” For marks including the letter “D” or the word
“blue,” Duke continues to allege section 2(d) likelihood of confusion, apparently believing that its trademark rights allow it to block
others from using something as elementary as a letter or a color. It
does so even when the “D” in question in no way resembles Duke’s
“D” marks and the products in question are unrelated. Its oppositions to marks using the word “blue” are perhaps the most tenuous—
while Duke owns a composite “blue devils” mark, it cannot claim
the word “blue.” Yet it opposed:
“Beach’d” for beach bags and cosmetic bags
“D’Grill” for barbecue smokers and grills
“DLove” for advertising and other services
“True Blue” for auto parts
“Stay Blue” for denim clothing
“Blue Ball Chiller” for alcoholic beverages
“Blue Solutions” for various goods and services related to car
rentals and car sharing.62
The examples above all received a “clearly erroneous” ranking
on our four-point scale.
In short, Duke is a trademark bully. Yet, it is an interesting bully.
Its pattern of aggressive behavior turns out to reveal some fascinating phenomena, both in the changing role of a university and in certain features of trademark law. Those features are misunderstood
and overstated, but they provide the superficial justifications for
trademark bullying.
What results did these 136 oppositions bring about?

62

BEACH’D, Opp’n No. 91,234,084 (filed Apr. 19, 2017); D’GRILL, Opp’n No.
91,234,213 (filed Apr. 26, 2017); DLOVE, Opp’n No. 91,240,747 (filed Apr. 18, 2018);
TRUE BLUE, Opp’n No. 91,223,933 (filed Sept. 21, 2015); STAY BLUE, Opp’n No.
91,232,929 (filed Feb. 15, 2017); BLUE BALL CHILLER, Opp’n No. 91,220,755 (filed
Feb. 23, 2015); BLUE SOLUTIONS, Opp’n No. 91,235,056 (filed June 12, 2017).
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5. Outcomes 63
Disposition of Opposition Proceedings
2015–2018: 136 Oppositions

Duke’s oppositions had an effect. Sixty-seven of the marks were
abandoned—a substantially higher percentage of abandonment than
for marks that are not opposed.64 Of those abandonments, fortyeight were default judgments—largely because the applicants did
not respond after the opposition was filed. Eighteen were explicit
withdrawals and one was an abandonment in exchange for Duke
63

The outcomes in this chart are current as of December 1, 2019.
These marks may have been abandoned for a variety of reasons. In some cases, the
applicant cannot afford the prohibitive expense of defending an opposition. See B. AUSTIN
GADDIS ET AL., DISCOURAGING FRIVOLOUS CLAIMS IN TRADEMARK OPPOSITION
PROCEEDINGS: A POLICY PROPOSAL TO THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK
OFFICE 3 (Samuel-Glushko Tech. Law & Policy Clinic, Univ. of Colo. Law Sch. ed., 2015),
available
at
https://tlpc.colorado.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2015/05/TMOppositionReform_WhitePaper3.pdf
[https://perma.cc/S5CM-35UZ] (“[S]maller companies simply cannot bear the financial
burden of defending an opposition.”). With applications filed on an “intent to use” basis,
the marks may have been abandoned because the applicant never began using the mark in
commerce.
64

426

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXXI:387

allowing registration of a different mark.65 Other than applications
in which Duke prevailed because of a failure to respond, or an explicit withdrawal, in two cases the TTAB entered a judgment on the
merits in favor of Duke.66 The few victories should neither count
against nor in favor of Duke—the TTAB explicitly encourages settlement in preference to issuing decisions.67 In a total of fifty-nine
cases, Duke withdrew its opposition either with or without some
modification of the mark or agreement between the parties. Of those
fifty-nine withdrawals, fifty-one marks were registered despite
Duke’s opposition. Eleven were registered without qualifying language and thirty-one were registered with an “agreement reached
for the avoidance of confusion” or “assurance.” 68 Nine were registered with some modification or exchange.69 In eight cases, Duke
withdrew its opposition, but the mark was not registered for a variety
of reasons.70 Finally, eight cases are still pending.
65

“Default judgments” result from inaction: the application is abandoned because the
applicant does not respond to official communications, and judgment is therefore entered
against them. By comparison, “withdrawals” result when the applicant affirmatively files
a document withdrawing their application. The TTAB categorizes both as “abandoned.”
Rules of Practice in Trademark Cases, 37 C.F.R. §§ 2.65, 2.68 (2021). Neither results from
an actual decision by the TTAB on the merits of Duke’s claims.
66
In the two cases where a decision was issued in Duke’s favor, only Duke filed a brief
or motion, and the applicants did not formally contest Duke’s arguments. As a result, one
claim was “granted as conceded” and the other was sustained in part due to admissions by
the applicant.
67
U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, TRADEMARK TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
MANUAL OF PROCEDURE § 605.01 (June 2020) (“The Board encourages settlement, and
several aspects of Board practice and procedure…serve to facilitate the resolution of cases
by agreement.”).
68
The TTAB documents note, in generic language, that some agreement had been
reached between the parties for avoidance of confusion. See, e.g., Opp’n No. 91,242,555,
Consented Withdrawal of Opposition (filed Nov. 25, 2019). This language could refer to
significant restrictions on the applicant’s use of the new mark or merely more modest or
face-saving acquiescence. In these cases, the record did not contain a formal modification
of the mark or the goods and services to which it applied.
69
Sometimes the proceedings involve multiple marks with different dispositions. If the
application for one of the marks was still pending, we classified the opposition as
“pending.” If one of the marks was registered, we classified the full opposition as
“registered.”
70
Three of those marks were abandoned for an unrelated reason, namely because the
applicant did not begin using the mark in commerce. The remaining five applications are
still pending for reasons other than the opposition proceeding. As a reminder, these
outcomes are current as of December 1, 2019.
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Do these numbers argue that Duke’s views of trademark law are
sound? After all, of the 136 marks it objected to, sixty-seven simply
went away, nine were amended, and Duke won in two cases. In
thirty-one cases, the TTAB record states as boilerplate that the opposition was withdrawn “in view of the agreement reached between
the parties for the avoidance of confusion”71 though the record does
not indicate what, if anything, that agreement stipulated. That means
that in 109 cases, or 80% of the total, Duke received a result that
could be described as favorable. One can imagine an institution saying, “This is effective! Let us keep doing it.” Sadly, we think the
results suggest that bullying works, particularly against parties that
do not have Duke’s resources. It does not suggest that bullying is
correct. Further, as we will discuss later in the Article, it is not clear
that these “victories” are worth the cost, either ethical or financial.72
To be frank, from the evidence we have been able to assess,
Duke gets little out of its oppositions other than a reputation as a
bully. When oppositions are unfounded because the marks do not
create a likelihood of confusion, then Duke gains little by persuading those non-confusing marks to abandon or modify their marks.
Why, then, does it continue to engage in the practice? There are two
possible meanings to the question “Why is Duke doing this?” The
first could be restated as, “Why is Duke, otherwise a sober and lawabiding entity, making legal claims that seem ungrounded and doing
so at such an anomalous rate vis a vis its peers?” The second could
be restated as “Forget the legal issues. What does Duke think it gets
out of this pattern of behavior?” These oppositions cost expensive
legal fees and institutional effort. Does Duke really think it stood to
be harmed by “True Blue” for auto parts, “Bluefood” for food,
“D’Grill” for barbecue smokers and grills, or “Devil’s Garden” for
alcoholic beverages? Or that it would benefit if it stopped these
marks from issuing? True, Duke’s director of trademark licensing
said, “[w]e find it’s much easier to proactively prevent confusion

71

See, e.g., Opp’n No. 91,245,555, Consented Withdrawal of Opposition at 1 (filed Nov.
25, 2019).
72
See discussion infra Section III.B.
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than to cure it after it happens.”73 But would any normal person look
at those marks and say, “They must come from Duke University!”?
Is there any possible financial upside, or avoidance of financial
downside, to engaging in a trademark theater of the absurd?
We believe the answers to those questions are linked. To understand how we got here, we have to focus both on what the university
thinks it is doing, and how it believes trademark law helps it—and
permits it—to achieve those goals. In the sections that follow, this
Article tries to do exactly that. We focus on three transformations,
one to the self-conception of the university, and two to trademark
law. These transformations do not justify trademark bullying.
Duke’s anomalous status as revealed by both empirical studies give
ample evidence of that fact. In fact, we will argue that Duke’s actions are technically irrational—the financial losses outweigh the
gains and are likely to continue to do so—even if one ignored the
ethical aspect of bullying. Yet those transformations do help to explain a mindset, an attitude towards business and the law, that leads
to bullying. This point has been echoed by other scholars who have
applied behavioral economic ideas to trademark bullying,74 but we
attempt to extend the analysis. That mindset, that legal and commercial consciousness, has implications far beyond Duke’s particular
actions. It bears on the more general phenomenon of university
overreach described in the introduction—both in diagnosis and in
potential cure. Among other things, policy proposals premised on
rational behavior are unlikely to work well in situations of systematic but patterned irrationality. Later, we assess the possible explanations for Duke’s behavior in the light of this analysis and conclude
with some policy recommendations, both for universities and for
trademark law.

73

Collin Binkley, Small Businesses Bear the Brunt when Big Colleges Fiercely Protect
Their Brand, CLAIMS J. (Aug. 30, 2018), https://www.claimsjournal.com/news/
national/2018/08/30/286497.htm [https://perma.cc/8HXZ-CXXA].
74
See generally Kiser, supra note 24.
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THREE TRANSFORMATIONS

A. The University as Mega-Brand
The first thing to note is the expansion of universities into the
role of mega-brands. Here, this is the reimagination of the role of a
university to be an entity that, in Duke’s own words, produces “a
wide range of products sold and licensed by Duke University, in virtually all areas of endeavor, to men, women and children of all
ages.”75 You might think that Duke University would have a series
of trademarks protecting its educational enterprises, its hospital’s
medical services, its sports teams, and so on. But trademark law also
protects the misleadingly-titled, unregistered federal “common
law”76 marks based merely on use. If we were to go into business
providing goods and services, even without registering a federal
mark, federal trademark law gives us some rights to protect our existing activities, though not to reserve that name for future expansion.77 The key here is actual use. One may not claim “dibs” on a
word for a particular use and thereby remove it from the public domain, preventing others from using it. Yet the list of products in
which Duke claims a common law trademark is seemingly endless.
Here is a small portion of the activities in which Duke claims to have
a common law mark:
Cosmetics, skin care products, personal bathing and
grooming products, and toiletries (including, by way
of example, body and nail art, decorative transfers,
face paint, glitter, personal care packs comprising
containers with toiletries therein, and toothbrushes);
. . . belts and suspenders; bibs; bottoms undergarments and other lingerie; Fabric for sewing; . . . Personal accessories (including, by way of example, hair
holders and hair ornaments, key holders, sunglasses,
75

See, e.g., Opp’n No. 91,242,557 at 11–12 (filed July 23, 2018). This language is
standard in Duke’s filings and appears in dozens of its opposition notices.
76
There is, of course, no general federal common law. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins,
304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). Even if there were, this is a poor name for marks protected as a
matter of federal law because of use, particularly since those marks are provided for
explicitly in the Lanham Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a).
77
See 15 U.S.C. § 1127.
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and wallets); Jewelry for men and women (including
both costume jewelry and jewelry of precious metal);
Time-keeping instruments (including clocks and
watches);…Electronic and computer accessories
(including, by way of example, data storage devices,
earphones, mouse pads, protective storage for
computers and computer accessories, speakers);
Housewares and household furnishings (including by
way of example candles, cushions, curtains, mats,
picture frames, rugs, and trash cans); bedding and
pillows; bathware (the latter including, by way of
example, towels, washcloths, bath mats, shower
curtains, toiletry holders, and bathing accessories);…Furniture (including by way of example
chairs, canopies, stools, and tables); Lighting and accessories therefor (including by way of example
night lights, lamps, lampshades, and flashlights);
Games and toys (including, by way of example, action figures, dolls, stuffed and plush toys, board
games, card games, electronic and video games, tabletop games, outdoor games and equipment for such
games); game tables…78
To be clear, this is a short excerpt to spare the reader’s patience.
There is much more. In fact, there are pages more. 79 This is something different in both quantity and quality. Duke is effectively turning trademark law upside down. As we observed in scores of oppositions over multiple years, when someone applies for a mark in an
area apparently completely unrelated to Duke University—commercial rigging, for example—Duke will then claim that it is already
offering goods or services in that area, often on the basis of scanty

78

This is boilerplate language in Duke’s oppositions. See, e.g., Opp’n No. 91,241,466
at 77 (filed May 30, 2018) (+1D STAT KNOWLEDGE IQ design and other +1D designs
for fantasy sports).
79
Duke has since moved on to gain registered trademarks over some of the more
plausible of these categories for branded merchandise, for example: computer cases, lamps,
refrigerators, jewelry, luggage, and balls for sport. Our rating of Duke’s oppositions from
the effective date of these registrations is correspondingly more generous for those
categories.
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evidence, apparently retrofitted to whatever mark Duke wishes to
oppose.
Duke then lists, as in the quoted paragraph above, claims to common law marks over a staggering array of “products sold and licensed by Duke University, in virtually all areas of endeavor, to
men, women and children of all ages.” 80 Thus, no matter what the
product is, Duke claims that its common law marks are being infringed. The reasoning is effectively, “since a Duke logo could be
slapped on anything, Duke owns a trademark in everything!” It is as
if Delta Airlines claimed that Delta faucets were infringing its mark
because planes have bathrooms with sinks in them.
This leads us to the other lessons that Duke’s behavior offers us:
it highlights a series of areas in which trademark law has strayed
from its core function. In each of these areas, the law actually stops
far short of creating an absolute property right over a word or symbol. Indeed, the courts have been explicitly hostile to such a move.
Yet brand owners use the existence of these departures as the basis
for their most aggressive—and often unsupportable—actions. We
pointed out that some universities have come to see themselves as
mega-brands. To some extent, part of this is trademark law’s fault.
The exceptions do not in fact destroy the rule, but an isolated institutional licensing culture can act as if they did, taking the anomalies
and placing them center stage, while downplaying trademark’s core
rationale and its central limiting doctrines. We will call this tendency “trademark maximalism.”
Trademark maximalism stitches together the doctrines we are
about to outline into an imaginative, but misleading, narrative. Exceptions allow brand bullies to deny the existence of the rule. Both
the platypus—which lays eggs—and the blue whale are mammals.
Yet, a zoologist who postulated that mammals either lay eggs or are
100-foot-long sea creatures would be off the mark. Trademark’s
anomalies are a similarly poor basis for general guidance.

80

See, e.g., Opp’n No. 91,242,557 at 11–12 (filed July 23, 2018).
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B. The Franchising Revolution
The first of the expansions of trademark law is the franchising
revolution. The goal of trademark is to act as a signal between producers and consumers. Stable brand identity is supposed to simplify
purchasing decisions by conveying information about product quality, ingredients, and source. Think how poorly this rationale fits affiliational goods—goods that are designed to signal an affiliation
with a university or a sports team.81 When most people buy a T-shirt
with Duke on it, they are not saying, “Wow, Duke makes such highquality T-shirts. This is the large white cotton T-shirt for me!” Instead, they are signaling an affiliation. The trademark “Duke” is not
being used in the way “Ivory” was for soap—telling me something
about ingredients and product quality and source. Instead, the trademark “Duke” is the product. The generic cotton T-shirt that is the
substrate for the logo is merely the delivery mechanism.
Imagine that I am a Duke fan and that I would pay up to $15 to
signal my allegiance. Let us say that the marginal cost of the shirt is
$3. Without trademark, in an efficient market, the price of the shirt
would fall asymptotically close to marginal cost, $3, and the surplus
of $12 would go to the consumer, rather than to the producer. Is this
a socially suboptimal result? That depends. If I think that the logo
“Duke” symbolizes “this shirt was produced by Duke, and it gets the
profits,” then I am being misled. Let us call that fan “Source Buyer.”
I am not getting what I paid for, though the low price might have
tipped me off. Still, that is a legitimate trademark complaint. But if
I simply want a piece of cloth that says “Duke” on it, at the lowest
practicable cost, then I am not. Call that fan “Affiliation Signaler.”
For the signaler, if the law allows Duke to use its state-granted monopoly over the word Duke to raise the price above marginal cost
for reasons unrelated to trademark law’s normal signaling function,
then it would be overreaching. Duke fans, presumably, include both
Source Buyers and Affiliation Signalers.82
81

See Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108
YALE L.J. 1687, 1708 (1999); Jessica Litman, Breakfast with Batman: The Public Interest
in the Advertising Age, 108 YALE L.J. 1717, 1725–28 (1999).
82
Empirical studies have shown a diversity of attitudes toward the assumption that most
purchasers will always assume sponsorship by the trademark owner, undercutting
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In practice, the law of trademark has sometimes, but not always,
chosen to minimize this complexity and to transfer the consumer
surplus to the producer. Partly this seems to rest on an idea that intellectual property owners should have an entitlement to all positive
externalities generated by their rights, for economic reasons. Without the ability to capture every cent of consumer surplus generated
by its symbols, goes the argument, Duke would be under-incentivized to produce excellence—whether in sports teams or education.
Partly it rests on the idea that it is simply wrong “to reap where one
has not sown,” regardless of the economic consequences. Finally, it
rests partly on the empirically dubious idea that most or all purchasers are “Source Buyers.” These arguments are, at best, questionable
and sometimes circular.83 Regardless, only Duke may make shirts

conclusions from older decisions. However, in Duke’s favor, assumptions of sponsorship
and attitudes towards material confusion (confusion that affects the purchasing decision)
appear to be more likely in sports merchandise. See Matthew Kugler, The Materiality of
Sponsorship Confusion, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1911, 1915 (2017) (“The results show that,
across a wide range of products and domains, sponsorship confusion is rarely material to
more than half of potential consumers. And, if only material confusion is counted, a number
of products that would need to be licensed under current law would instead be unrestricted.
Adopting a materiality requirement would therefore change the law of trademark
merchandising to a meaningful degree. The requirement would not, however, complete a
revolution in trademark sponsorship law. Sponsorship is material often enough that a great
many products would still need to be licensed. Most sports merchandise licensing, for
example, would remain secure even after discounting for materiality.”).
83
The argument that positive externalities must be fully internalized in order to generate
efficient outcomes is rarely debated at length. See Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley,
Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257, 276–79 (2007). Nor is the assumption that one may
not reap where one has not sown. When we do scrutinize those propositions, we are forced
to confront the fact that capitalism and the marketplace of ideas centrally depend on very
different assumptions. Every producer who learns from his competitor’s efforts—who is
given valuable information by his competitor’s choices of where to choose a store location
or how to design a product, every thinker who stands on the shoulders of giants—without
paying giant royalties, is benefitting from another without compensation. This process of
uncompensated taking of valuable information produced by others is actually part of our
definition of competition and free speech. Only in very limited circumstances do we give
the original innovator some form of right—a patent, copyright, trademark or trade secret—
which allows it to capture those positive externalities. In that sense, Brandeis appears
correctly to describe the premises of U.S. law in INS v. AP when he said, albeit in dissent,
“The general rule of law is, that the noblest of human productions—knowledge, truths
ascertained, conceptions, and ideas—become, after voluntary communication to others,
free as the air to common use.” Int’l News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 250
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which bear Duke’s logo and name. Acclimated to a world where
marks are the product rather than a signal of the quality of the product, many consumers may now find this normal. Duke did not start
this revolution. But, like most major universities, sports teams, and
mega-brands, it has been profoundly shaped by its results.
The decisions which extended the law in this way—the ones we
group under the label “the franchising revolution”—have been subject to robust academic criticism, most notably by Professors Stacy
Dogan, Mark Lemley, and Jessica Litman. 84 Pointing out the considerable normative and empirical uncertainty around the extension
of trademark law in this way, Dogan and Lemley argue:
Given these complexities, together with the economic interests at stake, one might expect that the
law and practice of merchandising rights would be
well-settled and reflect a considered balancing of the
interests of trademark holders and their competitors.
In reality, however, much of the multi-billion dollar
industry of merchandise licensing has grown around
a handful of cases from the 1970s and 1980s that established merchandising rights with little regard for
the competing legal or policy concerns at stake.
Those cases are far from settled law – indeed, at least
as many decisions decline to give trademark owners
the right to control sales of their trademarks as products. We think it is high time to revisit that case law
and to reconsider the theoretical justifications for a
merchandising right. That review provides little support for trademark owners’ assumptions about merchandising. Doctrinally, the most broad-reaching

(1918) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Or, to quote Justice Holmes from the same case,
“Property, a creation of law, does not arise from value, although exchangeable—a matter
of fact.” Id. at 246 (Holmes, J., dissenting). Though courts occasionally suggest, and brand
owners devoutly believe, that if value is produced, a right to capture that value should be
granted, this does not follow as a matter of either law or logic. See JAMES BOYLE, THE
PUBLIC DOMAIN: ENCLOSING THE COMMONS OF THE MIND 138, 147–53 (2008).
84
See generally Lemley, supra note 81; Litman, supra note 81; Stacey L. Dogan & Mark
A. Lemley, The Merchandising Right, Fragile Theory or Fait Accompli?, 54 EMORY L.J.
461 (2005).
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merchandising cases – which presumed infringement
based on the public recognition of the mark as a
trademark – were simply wrong in their analysis of
trademark infringement and have been specifically
rejected by subsequent decisions. Philosophically,
even a merchandising right that hinges on likelihood
of confusion raises competition-related concerns that
should affect courts’ analysis of both the merits and
appropriate remedies in merchandising cases. Perhaps most importantly, recent Supreme Court case
law suggests that, if it had the opportunity to evaluate
the merchandising theory (something it has never
done), the Court would deny the existence of such a
right. Further, the Court would be right to do so.
When a trademark is sold, not as a source indicator,
but as a desirable feature of a product, competition
suffers – and consumers pay – if other sellers are shut
out of the market for that feature. 85
They conclude that the legal basis for an unfettered merchandising or franchising right is at best, mixed, and that there are compelling normative reasons running against it.86 Courts have often been
equally hostile to the premises of the franchising right. In one case,
for example, involving T-shirts bearing the (unauthorized) symbol
and name of Duke’s neighbor, the University of North Carolina at
Chapel Hill, the court first pointed out the considerable variation in
the circuit court decisions on this issue, and then went on to confront
the difference between source and affiliation buyers head-on:
[T]he court is skeptical that those individuals who
purchase unlicensed tee-shirts bearing [University of
North Carolina at Chapel Hill] marks care one way
or the other whether the University sponsors or endorses such products or whether the products are officially licensed. Instead, as defendants contend, it is

85
86

Dogan & Lemley, supra note 84, at 464–65.
Id.
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equally likely that individuals buy the shirts to show
their support for the University.87
To be fair, other courts have come to the opposite conclusion,
particularly in the sports franchising context and that may now be
the majority view. We have tried to make our assessment as sympathetic to Duke’s position as possible. Accordingly, while we agree
with those scholars and courts that have been skeptical about the
merchandising right for universities, we assumed exactly the opposite for the purposes of this study. If someone buys a shirt with
“Duke University” or “Duke Blue Devils” on it, regardless of
whether they care that the product was in fact produced or licensed
by Duke, we assume in this Article that Duke is entitled to the profit.
Correspondingly, in our coding we rated all of Duke’s actions opposing marks which would interfere with such markets as sound. For
example, when Duke opposed “Cameron Krzyz” for apparel (the
trademarked nickname for Duke basketball fans is “Cameron Crazies”) we coded that as “sound,”88 one of only three that year which
achieved that favorable rating.
In this Article, we have assumed for argument’s sake that the
merchandising revolution is a fait accompli. In other words, though
we agree with scholarly skepticism about the precedent and policy
of the franchising revolution, when assessing whether Duke is a
trademark bully, we have assumed the opposite: that Duke is in fact
entitled to the trademark and financial benefits resulting from that
process. Our conclusion, in other words, is based on a generous interpretation of Duke’s legal rights. We have three reasons for doing
so. First, we want to be clear that our coding of Duke’s decisions is
not a harsh one, which makes its conclusions all the more
87

Bd. of Governors of Univ. of N.C. v. Helpingstine, 714 F. Supp. 167, 173 (M.D.N.C.
1989); see also Int’l Order of Job’s Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co., 633 F.2d 912, 918 (9th
Cir. 1980) (“We commonly identify ourselves by displaying emblems expressing
allegiances. Our jewelry, clothing and cars are emblazoned with inscriptions showing the
organizations we belong to, the schools we attend, the landmarks we have visited, the sports
teams we support, the beverages we imbibe. Although these inscriptions frequently include
names and emblems that are also used as collective marks or trademarks, it would be naive
to conclude that the name or emblem is desired because consumers believe that the product
somehow originated with or was sponsored by the organization the name or emblem
signifies.”).
88
CAMERON KRZYZ, Opp’n No. 91,229,209 (filed July 27, 2016).
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remarkable. Second, we think that an entire industry has been built
on a “generous” interpretation of the law. Perhaps those early decisions were poorly reasoned. Perhaps their subsequent interpretation
by business culture imposes unjustified costs on consumers, at least
half of whom appear empirically not to be Source Buyers. Or perhaps—at least in the university context—it creates an incentive for
the university to stray far from its central mission in ways that might
not be good for either the university or society. Still, despite those
considerations, the industry exists and the courts would, rightly, be
hesitant to disrupt it. Finally, the notion that Duke University should
get the profits reaped from the use of its name has both an intuitive
normative appeal and a self-fulfilling dimension. As Professor Lemley explains:
Ironically, having accepted the merchandising rationale for certain sorts of trademarks, we may find
it hard to undo. It is possible that consumers have
come to expect that ‘Dallas Cowboys’ caps are licensed by the Cowboys, not because they serve a
trademark function, but simply because the law has
recently required such a relationship. If this expectation exists, consumers may be confused if the law
changes. But a limited, likelihood-of-confusion rationale for keeping a bad law intact is quite different
from a theoretical justification for cementing and extending the merchandising right. There are lots of famous marks and icons for which we have not granted
merchandising rights. No one controls the exclusive
right to make ‘Statue of Liberty’ tee-shirts or paperweights, for example. Even if we decide not to undo
what we have done in the sports cases, there is no
reason to take it any further, since it is hard to find
any theoretical or statutory basis for the property approach to trademarks.89

89

Lemley, supra note 81, at 1708–09. Lemley’s conclusions about the overreach of
modern trademark law have been widely, and approvingly, cited by courts. See, e.g.,
Radiance Foundation, Inc. v. NAACP, 786 F.3d 316, 325 (4th Cir. 2015); CPC Int’l, Inc.
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As Lemley points out, even if one accepts the dubious logic of
the franchising revolution, there is no reason to go beyond it. 90 For
example, would you assume that a mockumentary about beauty contests in Minnesota dairy country called “Dairy Queens” was sponsored by the ice cream chain of the same name? One—widely criticized—court decision did.91 To paraphrase the leading treatise on
trademark, there are decisions that step beyond the lines. 92 We have
accepted that—contrary to the court’s reasoning in the Board of
Governors of the University of North Carolina v. Helpingstine93—
Duke is entitled to any revenues from merchandise that directly signals connection to Duke as a university or a sports team. We have,
however, rejected the claim that since Duke has some rights based
on sponsorship or affiliation, it therefore has rights in gross over all
uses of the word “Duke” or “Devil” or “Blue” or the letter “D.” True,
Duke could in theory slap its name on any domain of goods and
services—and thus claim that it effectively controlled the word
“Duke.” But the premise proves too much; 193 other “Duke” trademark owners could claim the same thing.
C. Anti-Dilution
The second expansion of trademark law beyond its traditional
boundaries comes from the creation of federal anti-dilution protection for famous brands.94 If a mark is famous with the general consuming public, section 43(c) of the Lanham Act conveys extra protections beyond the prohibitions on simple trademark infringement 95
and misleading source identification.96 This right is an expansive

v. Skippy Inc., 214 F.3d 456, 462 (4th Cir. 2000); Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. v.
Tabari, 610 F.3d 1171, 1180 (9th Cir. 2010); I.P. Lund Trading ApS v. Kohler Co., 118 F.
Supp. 2d 92, 99 (D. Mass. 2000).
90
Lemley, supra note 81, at 1708–09.
91
See Am. Dairy Queen Corp. v. New Line Prods., Inc., 35 F. Supp. 2d 727, 732 (D.
Minn. 1998); Lemley & McKenna, supra note 6, at 418.
92
See 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
§ 24:10 (5th ed. 2020).
93
See Helpingstine, 714 F. Supp. at 173.
94
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c).
95
15 U.S.C. § 1114.
96
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1).
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one that rejects most of the normal limitations on trademarks. The
statute reads:
Subject to the principles of equity, the owner of a famous mark that is distinctive, inherently or through
acquired distinctiveness, shall be entitled to an injunction against another person who, at any time after the owner’s mark has become famous, commences use of a mark or trade name in commerce that
is likely to cause dilution by blurring or dilution by
tarnishment of the famous mark, regardless of the
presence or absence of actual or likely confusion, of
competition, or of actual economic injury. 97
It is hard to find compelling policy reasons for the creation of
federal anti-dilution protection, other than circular arguments, political capture and the nostrum that “to those that have, more shall be
given.” Famous marks might seem to be least in need of extra protection, but they are singled out and given that protection because of
their fame. Yet precisely because of the absence of trademark law’s
normal limitations—no requirement of actual or likely confusion,
competition or economic injury—both Congress and the courts have
had to trim the extent of the resulting right.
To begin with, the protection is stated to be one that is “subject
to the principles of equity,” and it specifically excludes fair, nominative or descriptive uses, comparative advertising, identification,
parody, commentary, criticism, news reporting, and non-commercial uses of the mark.98 Arguably, the First Amendment required at
least some of those limitations since, by doing away with trademark
law’s traditional limitations such as the requirements of competition, confusion, and activity-specificity, Congress is operating on
the edge of its powers. In preventing the likelihood of consumer
confusion in the marketplace, Congress’s powers to restrain speech
are well-defined and justified. When confusion, competition, and
economic harm are explicitly stated to be irrelevant to the statutory
violation, Congress’s authority is more dubious and the restraints
imposed seem both more draconian and less justifiable—a straight
97
98

15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (emphasis added).
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3).
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semantic land-grab that takes uses that otherwise would be in the
public domain and conveys them to a private party, thus restraining
otherwise constitutionally protected speech acts for no identifiable
public purpose.99
Next, Congress amended the anti-dilution provisions to require
that the mark be famous among the general consuming public, doing
away with the idea of “niche fame”—fame in a particular market
segment.100 Courts have proven attentive to the importance of this
limitation. Coach Services, the makers of the eponymous handbags,
might seem to be a very famous brand. They certainly believed they
were. But when they sued a company that wanted to use the mark
“Coach” for learning software, designed to train students in how to
pass standardized tests, they discovered that the courts set the bar
for fame very high, particularly “where, as here, the mark is a common English word that has different meanings in different contexts.”101 “Coach,” like “Duke,” is a word that has multiple meanings, only a single one of which is related to the allegedly famous
mark. At the very least that makes it much harder to satisfy the requirements of fame. By contrast, a coined word such as “Google,”
existing only in the context of a particular good or service, has a
much stronger case. Owners of well-known marks frequently assert
that they are “famous.” Duke does so repeatedly in its oppositions.
But the lay, and legal, senses of that word are distinct. Duke’s case
for legal fame is very weak.
In addition, for a finding of dilution by blurring, the courts are
instructed to look to “the extent to which the owner of the famous
mark is engaging in substantially exclusive use of the mark.” 102
99

Cf. S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 561 (1987)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
100
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A).
101
Coach Services v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“It
is well-established that dilution fame is difficult to prove.”); see also Toro Co. v. ToroHead
Inc., 61 U.S.P.Q.2d 1164, 1180 (T.T.A.B. 2001) (“Fame for dilution purposes is difficult
to prove.”); Everest Capital, Ltd. v. Everest Funds Mgmt. LLC, 393 F.3d 755, 763 (8th Cir.
2005) (“The judicial consensus is that ‘famous’ is a rigorous standard.”); 4 J. THOMAS
MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 24:104 (noting that
fame for dilution is “a difficult and demanding requirement” and that, although “all
‘trademarks’ are ‘distinctive’—very few are ‘famous’”).
102
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B)(iii).
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Again, unlike a company such as Google, Duke is not. Indeed, there
are 193 federally registered marks having nothing to do with Duke
University that include the word “Duke.” These other registered
marks give ample evidence of the multiple possible meanings of the
word Duke, from aristocrat, to a pugilist’s fists, to a slang term for
eminence, to a nickname, or relatively common surname, but they
also show that the term is being used in commerce—as a mark—by
many others. Some of those marks are surprising. For example,
Duke’s booster club is called the “Iron Dukes,” named after a group
of 1938 Duke football players whose defense was legendary. Nothing might seem more central to Duke’s trademark holdings. Yet
there is a registered mark for “Iron Duke” for wheat flour, 103 dating
from 1920, long before the actual Iron Dukes played on Duke’s football team or the booster club adopted that name. Wikipedia helpfully
supplies multiple other uses of the phrase, including seven people,
four ships, two trains, an engine, a film, a pub, and a novel.104 And
that is the unusual coinage “Iron Duke.” What about “Duke” itself?
Substantially exclusive use of the mark? 193 others say “no.”
Thus, in our opinion, it is clear that “Duke”—standing alone—
is not famous, and in any event is not entitled to protection from
“blurring” by other users of this English word. There is an argument
that “Duke Blue Devils” might be famous, though Duke does not
own a federally registered mark in the full composite phrase, and
there are others with “Blue Devil” marks. Writing this Article in
basketball-mad North Carolina, the aura of fame seems plausible.
Yet it is worth repeating that the current anti-dilution law, as a price
for the extraordinary broad rights it grants, did away with the notion
of “niche fame”—fame in a particular market segment—instead requiring fame among the general consuming public. When the University of Texas, Duke’s only real competitor in aggressive trademark assertion, claimed that its Texas Longhorns logo was famous,
the (brave, Western District of Texas) judge had this to say:
One of the central revisions of the TDRA was to
make it more difficult to get the “rights in gross” that
103

IRON DUKE, Registration No. 134,297.
Iron Duke, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iron_Duke
[https://perma.cc/6YBC-PPS2].
104
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a famous mark is entitled to. Getting rid of niche
fame, the federal trademark law (as already noted)
now requires that the mark be “widely recognized by
the general consuming public of the United States.”
And the central problem for UT is that its circumstantial evidence is largely evidence of niche market
fame. Reading through the evidence, it is not at all
clear that if one is not a college football fan (or, to a
much lesser extent, college baseball or basketball
fan) would recognize the [Longhorn Logo] as being
associated with UT, as all of the evidence relates to
the use of the logo in sporting events. The Court is
well aware that NCAA college football is a popular
sport—the Court counts itself as a more than casual
fan of Saturday afternoon football in the Fall but this
hardly equals a presence with the general consuming
public (nearly the entire population of the United
States). Simply because UT athletics have achieved
a level of national prominence does not necessarily
mean that the longhorn logo is so ubiquitous and
well-known to stand toe-to-toe with Buick or
KODAK.105
The reasoning here seems directly apposite to Duke’s marks. We
all live inside our regional or leisure bubbles and that makes it hard
to judge, but the requirement of national fame to the general consuming public of the United States is a daunting one. If “Duke Blue
Devils” did satisfy the requirements for fame, then the protection
would only allow it to enjoin marks that seemed likely to blur or
tarnish the entire mark, not its component parts. That protection
would be exceedingly narrow.
Finally, even where the mark did meet the threshold of fame, in
applying the anti-dilution provisions courts have been reluctant to
find infringement. Perhaps this is because of the inconsistency of the
right with trademark’s larger rationale and the possibility for abuse
of the right it provides. Unlike “Duke” or “Coach,” “Starbucks” and
105

Bd. of Regents, Univ. of Tex. Sys. ex rel. Univ. of Tex. at Austin v. KST Elec., Ltd.,
550 F. Supp. 2d 657, 678 (W.D. Tex. 2008) (internal citations omitted).
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“Louis Vuitton” are unique words and phrases. 106 Courts accordingly found that both of them were famous within the meaning of
the statute. Given the breadth of the legal protection conferred, one
would expect therefore that a competitor’s use of “Charbucks” (for
coffee!) or “Chewy Vuiton” (for doggy chew toys covered in the
Louis Vuitton logo!) were guilty of either blurring or tarnishment.
The courts found that they were not. 107
Large brands love the protection of anti-dilution since it appears
to free them of trademark law’s pesky requirements to show likely
confusion, competition, injury and so on. But trademark owners are
much more likely to threaten to use anti-dilution than to litigate it to
conclusion, because they know that the courts view such claims
skeptically, that the thresholds for both gaining the right and infringing it are extremely high, and they wish to avoid a contrary ruling.
This is a saber more frequently rattled than used. Duke’s oppositions
are consistent with that fact.
III.

IMPLICATIONS

A. Maximalism Beyond Duke
Trademark oppositions are the visible, and publicly searchable,
tip of the iceberg. You have to go on the record and you have to give
reasons. But the maximalism we describe here is by no means confined to trademark oppositions or to Duke. At the beginning of the
Article, we pointed out that Duke is not alone among universities in
“aggressive” trademark claims and that oppositions are only a tiny
fraction of the totality of trademark assertion. For example, Boise
State’s football team plays on a blue football field. It claimed a
trademark in blue football fields. But in 2010, it decided that this
was not enough. It decided to claim that all non-green sporting fields
would infringe its trademark:

106

Lovers of Moby Dick might demur.
See Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe’s Borough Coffee, Inc., 736 F.3d 198, 213 (2d Cir.
2013); Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, 507 F.3d 252, 269 (4th Cir.
2007).
107
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Citing a legal doctrine called initial interest confusion, which means Boise State has the right to license
or deny any field that could be mistakenly associated
with its trademark, the university expanded its trademark from blue to non-green in 2010.108
Though it apparently convinced The New York Times that
merely by saying things—“Abracadabra!” “Initial interest confusion!”—it could magically “expand[] its trademark from blue to
non-green,” Boise State is mistaken. Its claim is just as far-fetched
as the Duke oppositions we discussed. Indeed, it might be more so.
One can claim a trademark in a color. The Supreme Court held this
in a case called Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co. But the Court
explicitly said that the reason it would consider colors eligible for
trademarks was because it felt that the dangers of overreach, and of
denying other colors to potential competitors, were constrained by
limitations internal to the law, particularly the functionality doctrine:
When a color serves as a mark, normally alternative
colors will likely be available for similar use by others. Moreover, if that is not so—if a “color depletion”
or “color scarcity” problem does arise—the trademark doctrine of “functionality” normally would
seem available to prevent the anti competitive consequences that Jacobson’s [the party opposing the
mark] argument posits, thereby minimizing that argument’s practical force….Although we need not
comment on the merits of specific cases, we note that
lower courts have permitted competitors to copy the
green color of farm machinery (because customers
wanted their farm equipment to match) and have
barred the use of black as a trademark on outboard
boat motors (because black has the special functional
attributes of decreasing the apparent size of the motor and ensuring compatibility with many different
boat colors). The upshot is that, where a color serves
a significant nontrademark function…courts will
108

Fortier, supra note 3. We owe the examples to Mark Lemley.
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examine whether its use as a mark would permit one
competitor (or a group) to interfere with legitimate
(nontrademark-related) competition through actual
or potential exclusive use of an important product
ingredient…ordinarily, it should prevent the anticompetitive consequences of Jacobson’s hypothetical “color depletion” argument, when, and if, the
circumstances of a particular case threaten “color
depletion.”109
Thus, the last thing a court would allow is the expansion of a
trademark on blue football fields into all non-green football fields.
If courts are coming to the rescue of mariners who are asking, “Does
this motor make my boat look big?” or fashion-forward farmers who
worry about color-coordinating their tractors, they are hardly about
to hand over a legal monopoly in all non-green athletic fields merely
because someone says “Trademark!” It is hard to think of a clearer
case of color depletion that would interfere with competition. Boise
State is misusing trademark law. The doctrine on which it apparently
relied, “initial interest confusion,” does not change that fact. It is a
controversial idea, of dubious relevance to this kind of case, from
which courts have increasingly backed away. 110 So this is a misuse
of trademark law that, if it were to be believed or acceded to, would
restrict competition unnecessarily. Yet it would not show up as an
opposition or cancellation proceeding.
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Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 168–70 (1995).
See Lamparello v. Falwell, 420 F.3d 309, 315–17 (4th Cir. 2005) (expressing
skepticism about initial interest confusion and limiting its application to “use of another
firm’s mark to capture the markholder’s customers and profits”); Vail Assocs., Inc. v.
Vend-Tel-Co., 516 F.3d 853, 872 (10th Cir. 2008) (“[A] court cannot simply assume a
likelihood of initial interest confusion, even if it suspects it. The proponent of such a theory
must prove it.”); Sensient Techs. Corp. v. Sensory Effects Flavor Co., 613 F.3d 754, 766
(8th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 562 U.S. 1270 (2011) (declining to apply initial interest
confusion when “customers are sophisticated and exercise a relatively high degree of care
in making their purchasing decisions”); Gibson Guitar Corp. v. Paul Reed Smith Guitars,
423 F.3d 539, 551 (6th Cir. 2005) (rejecting initial interest confusion in cases involving
alleged infringement of product shape trade dress); see also Jennifer E. Rothman, Initial
Interest Confusion: Standing at the Crossroads of Trademark Law, 27 CARDOZO L. REV.
105, 122 (2005).
110
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Or what about universities that wish to use trademark, or more
correctly “the appearance of trademark language in a nasty lawyer’s
letter with no legal basis,” to police their image? NYU managed to
get the TV show Felicity to change the name of the university in the
show because the students it featured were sexually active. 111 Of
course, we see NYU’s point. Nothing could be more foreign to the
college experience than sexual experimentation. Stanford University got a movie called Stealing Stanford to change its title because
the plot featured a student who stole in order to afford tuition.112 One
of us, a Harvard alumnus, is delighted that the movie title was
changed to “Stealing Harvard.” Apparently, Harvard made no objection. These two threats, of course, have no basis in trademark law.
They are an attempt illicitly to use trademark language to police image—a subject that goes beyond the issues of trademark opposition
we discuss here and yet is illuminated by them.
The Ohio State University is unlikely to get a trademark over the
definite article.113 Boise State does not “own” the concept of all nongreen sports fields. Stanford and NYU are not legally entitled to prohibit writers of fiction from depicting their students stealing or being
sexually active. The Associated Press story with which we began
this Article also mentions examples of bullying from NC State, the
University of Minnesota, and Texas A&M. The University of
Texas’s thirty trademark oppositions, and its attempts to claim “famous mark” status, show that Duke’s conduct is not as isolated as it
might seem.
Still, Duke is an outlier. Based on the empirical and legal analysis we present here, it appears undeniable that Duke is a trademark
bully. The Comparative Study shows just how anomalous Duke’s
oppositions are—substantially exceeding all of the oppositions
raised by all twenty-eight other universities in our three comparison
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Lemley & McKenna, supra note 6, at 420.
Lemley & McKenna, supra note 6, at 421. Ignoring the correct method to gain
entrance to Stanford, which of course, is fraudulently pretending to be a student on the
sailing team. See Matthias Gafni & Evan Sernoffsky, 13 Bay Area Parents and Stanford
Sailing Coach Implicated in College Admissions Bribery Scandal, S.F. CHRONICLE (Mar.
12, 2019, 6:32 PM), https://www.sfchronicle.com/crime/article/Stanford-sailing-teamimplicated-in-college-13682141.php [https://perma.cc/JJ73-RGSJ].
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See supra Introduction.
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groups, combined. That fact alone ought to raise concerns. The
Merit Study showed that Duke reaches such gaudy numbers only by
making claims that are not well-grounded in trademark law. Over a
four-year period, we found that 85% of its oppositions were either
clearly erroneous or far-fetched. We felt that we gave Duke the benefit of the doubt in many cases but even if our coding were systematically too harsh and we changed the ratings accordingly, Duke’s
behavior would still be problematic. For example, if we bumped all
our assessments up one grade in Duke’s favor—making all of the
clearly erroneous oppositions merely far-fetched, and so on—then
Duke would still look like a trademark bully, with 55% of its actions
being rated as far-fetched and only 15% as sound.
Of course, we assume that Duke’s actions were taken in good
faith. But they seem to reflect both a deep legal mistake and a questionable institutional premise. To begin with, they rest on a systematic misunderstanding of both the law and policy of trademark. Next,
they rest on an aggressive, but perhaps not well thought-out, intention to position Duke as an entity that sells everything—and a famous one at that—giving it a right of near total control of “Duke,”
“Blue,” “Devil,” the letter D, and so on. It is the combination of
those two misunderstandings that makes Duke such an outlier in
both the quantity and the quality of its trademark objections, but also
perhaps a useful warning about tendencies in collegiate trademark
maximalism.
B. Why Bully?
This brings us back to the question we raised earlier: why is
Duke doing this? Why might other universities follow suit? Trademark oppositions are expensive. Estimates in the scholarly literature
range from $90,000 to $500,000 in legal costs to pursue an opposition through every possible stage of the process. 114 (The latter number seems implausibly high to us.) The wide variation appears to
114
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derive from different assumptions about which legal actions would
be pursued. However, these numbers exaggerate the routine costs.
Frequently, Duke can get its way with a legal “nastygram” that costs
only a few hours of lawyer time to produce. Many other oppositions
settle quickly, keeping costs down. Nevertheless, the vigor of the
formal opposition practice we studied here shows that Duke is willing to sink expensive institutional resources into an activity that appears, at best, pointless—even if one ignored the ethical concerns.
Imagine a classic homo economicus administrator at Duke
deciding whether to oppose “Bluefood,” “Blue Ball Chillers,” or
“D’Grill” for barbecue smokers and grills. On one side, her analysis
would measure costs to Duke in the form of direct legal expenses
and perhaps indirect harm to reputation if it were seen as legally
unscrupulous. She would then weigh those against the likely benefits which the opposition might produce or the harms that it might
forestall. At the outset, the precise legal costs of any individual action would be unknown. Duke cannot know whether this particular
counterparty will fight the issue out to the bitter end or fold at the
first nasty letter. But Duke is nothing if not a repeat player in this
market. It would have a very good estimate of aggregate possibilities
and thus the associated costs over a year’s worth of oppositions.
What benefits go on the other side of the scale?
First, there is the much-cited danger of abandonment. With examples like the ones we used above—and indeed with all of the oppositions coded 1 (clearly erroneous) and 2 (far-fetched)—that danger does not exist. A rational, legally informed cost-benefit analyst
would know that. Second, there is speculative future harm to Duke’s
brand and to markets for Duke products and services. Again, at least
with the oppositions coded 1 and 2, it is hard to see that possibility—
even assuming, as we did, that Duke is entitled to all the consumer
surplus from both Source Buyers and Affiliation Signalers. To put
it another way, even if Duke gets every available dollar from the
sales of “Duke” and “Blue Devil” merchandise, “D’Grill” for barbecue smokers and grills poses no threat to current or future markets.
So, at least with many of the oppositions, we have a hefty cost and
no apparent benefit. Rational actor theory tells us, therefore, that
these oppositions should not exist—the decision that many of our
sister institutions seem to have made. E pur si muove. Why?
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1. Trademark Law’s Poor Incentives
Part of the blame must be put on trademark law. For example,
trademark law can be used to raise competitors’ costs and erect barriers to entry. All legal rights can be misused, of course, and wealthy
parties with good legal representation will often be able to work the
system to their advantage. Yet the indeterminacy of intellectual
property rights makes them particularly susceptible to overbroad
claims—thus allowing them to be used to subvert the marketplace
they are supposed to protect. In a fascinating series of interviews
with intellectual property counsel, Professor William Gallagher
found that attorneys were frank about this aspect of the law.
Q: Has that happened in a recent trademark case for
you, where you represent a big client and are trying
to enforce a weak case on the merits, weak in your
opinion?
A: Oh yeah! (laughs) I’ve had a case recently where
I think we were probably wrong on the merits….The
lawyer on the other side was yelling at me about we
didn’t have a case, and I said you must be confusing
me with somebody who cares about the merits. We
are the giant in this case and we’ve decided we’re not
going to tolerate this, we’re not going to give up.
Q: Was that effective?
A: Yeah, it worked. They gave up. We just didn’t
want this individual using the client’s mark. They’re
no threat to us, a different world, very different services. No real likelihood of confusion. But we just
didn’t want them to use it, use their mark. 115
In that case, fault lies with the bully that knows it is overreaching
but “doesn’t care about the merits.” The lawyer who made such a
claim arguably committed a sanctionable ethical violation. But it
also lies with a trademark system that had a chance to impose
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penalties for trademark bullying, or introduce higher standards, but
has chosen so far largely to minimize the problem. In that case,
trademark law is guilty of a sin of omission, a failure to remedy
abuse, but it has also set up poor incentives for trademark owners,
ones which encourage overreaching. For example, courts sometimes
look at the vigor with which a particular trademark is defended in
assessing the “strength of the mark” in a trademark action. Thus, the
existence of similar marks on products and services that are vaguely
adjacent to the mark-holders’ business could count against a trademark holder in an infringement action. Professor Stacy Dogan, herself a frequent critic of trademark bullying, argues that this produces
perverse incentives:
[T]he law has not only failed in its function of delineating clear boundaries of trademark holder rights; it
has arguably made things worse, by defining trademarks’ value, at least in part, by reference to uses that
fall outside any reasonable definition of those boundaries….When a lawyer for Monster Energy Drinks
recommended that the company object to a brewery’s sale of Vermonster beer, she probably did not
perceive any real risk of confusion or dilution of the
Monster Energy marks. But she may well have concluded that objecting to any drink-related use of
monster would help to preserve the strength of her
client’s mark, in general, in future cases. This doesn’t
mean that the world is better off as a result of that
action; but it does mean that the accused bully had a
plausible reason for its aggression. If we want to curb
that aggression, we should modify trademark law’s
incentives.116
Professor Dogan’s point is well-taken. Trademark doctrine encourages, or at least does not deter, some trademark bullying. Duke
is not acting in a legal vacuum. But that explanation has limitations.
Most of Duke’s clearly erroneous and far-fetched oppositions are in
fields that are not even arguably similar. At least Vermonster beer
was a drink. Duke’s oppositions go beyond any tactical rationale of
116
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opposing similar marks on similar goods and services—unless Duke
thinks trademark law allows it to control dissimilar marks on all
goods and services. Even trademark law’s harshest critic would not
claim it sends that message currently.
Herman Kahn, the game theorist, famously suggested that the
best tactic in a game of “chicken” between two drivers is to throw
the steering wheel out of the window, showing the other driver that
you could not change course.117 Cultivating a reputation as a trademark bully could provide such benefits. If I demonstrate to you that
I will oppose everything, no matter how legally ungrounded my
claims, you might be dissuaded in the future from doing something
that might harm me. Yet for that strategy to be worthwhile, the
prospect of harm—or benefit—has to be real at least some of the
time. There is a cost to jettisoning the steering wheel. Kahn was
assuming that there was a prize for the game of chicken. Even given
Professor Dogan’s argument, it is not clear that Duke’s actions
actually produce any such prize. Throwing the steering wheel out of
the window when there isn’t a game of chicken going on seems less
rational. Nevertheless, the possibility of gaming behavior has to be
considered and right now trademark law has inadequate remedies
against it.
Trademark’s anti-dilution right provides another set of poorly
aligned incentives. As we previously pointed out, the creation of
federal protection for famous marks expands trademark protection
beyond its normal boundaries and limitations. The owner of a famous mark can enjoin other similar marks even in the absence of
competition, actual or likely confusion, or economic injury. The
anti-dilution right looks a lot closer to an absolute right over a name
or symbol than anything Federal law had previously offered. What
rational, dutiful lawyer would not want that protection for his or her
client? Does the attempt to win famous mark status, the anti-dilution
long game, explain Duke’s behavior? Again, that can only be a partial explanation. Congress and the courts have been clear about how
hard it is to get “famous mark” designation. A university which has
as its name a common English word with multiple other meanings
117
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and which also has to deal with 193 owners of other federally registered “Duke” marks has a vanishingly small chance of clearing the
high bar the law sets up. “Duke Blue Devils” has a better chance at
achieving famous mark status, but Duke does not confine its claims
of famous mark status to that mark. If “Duke” were a coined word
like “Google” and if those 193 other marks did not exist, then aggressive opposition of even clearly unrelated products would make
more sense. Since neither of those is the case, trademark law’s incentives can be, at best, a partial explanation.
One reason we wrote this Article was that we thought a close
focus on Duke’s behavior might help to highlight the strengths and
weaknesses of trademark doctrine more broadly. We think it did. In
each of the areas where trademark law has arguably invited overreach—a hypertrophied franchising right divorced from trademark’s
rationale, ludicrous assertions of sponsorship and affiliation that no
rational person would perceive, and overbroad claims of famous
mark status—Duke has taken the invitation, despite the fact that
these are clearly outliers on which the courts and Congress have set
constraints. Trademark law is part of the problem and any solution
needs to be directed at the law’s incentives generally, not just on
Duke’s actions. But, as we have suggested here, this explanation has
limits and Duke’s range of opposition appears to exceed those limits
substantially. Moreover, if this were an entirely rational response to
changes in trademark law, one would expect that other universities’
actions would mirror Duke’s. So far, they have not, though that
seems to be changing. A “rational,” albeit overreaching, legal strategy based around trademark law’s incentives, then, can be only part
of the explanation.
2. The Behavioral Economics of Trademark Maximalism
At least in the US system, intellectual property rights are utilitarian—designed to produce a particular result.118 We encourage
creators by granting them copyrights and patents in order to incentivize the next creator, not to reward hard work or because we believe that there is an absolute and natural right in one’s books or
118
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inventions. We protect trademarks in order to avoid consumer confusion and to simplify and incentivize benign information flow in
the market. It is for those reasons that intellectual property rights are
so limited. The copyright protects only original expression: facts and
ideas go immediately into the public domain, free for all to use. The
trademark does not convey ownership of a word or symbol, or the
right to engage in semantic policing of speech you do not like, absent plausible consumer confusion. Rightsholders, however, may
have a more simplistic conception of their rights, believing that they
approach sole despotic dominion. One of us has written about the
ways in which an absolute, physicalist conception of intellectual
property rights can lead to overbroad claims and socially harmful
policy proposals.119 A rightsholder in this position is not consciously
overreaching. They come to believe that they have the right to police
mentions of their university in television shows or the color of other
college’s football fields.
This jurisprudential maximalism may be connected to a particular set of psychological traits. In a fascinating article, Professor Jessica Kiser argues that behavioral economics—in particular, prospect
theory—helps to explain apparently “irrational” examples of trademark bullying: occasions where an objective calculation of loss and
gain would deter neo-classical economics’ rational actor from bullying behavior, but the psychological biases identified by behavioral
economics explain the action.120 Behavioral economics argues that
actors put a disproportionate weight on losses as opposed to gains,
and that there is a corresponding effect that causes individuals to
overvalue the certainty with which a loss can be avoided. 121 Consider, for example, irrationally expensive but psychologically attractive consumer warranties; did you get Applecare because you believed that, if you did not, the regret you felt if the computer broke
would be so much worse? Behavioral economics also postulates that
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decisions are strongly influenced by a number of “baseline” assumptions, such as the endowment effect, where actors will value something more highly if told they already have a property right in it, or
the sunk cost fallacy, where actors irrationally continue actions because they cannot bear to write off the amount of money that has
already been spent on them.122 Kiser argues that all of these factors
may be present in the case of apparently irrational trademark bullying:
Even if an attorney tells her client that failure to stop
all remotely infringing or diluting trademark use
rarely results in the abandonment of a trademark, that
attorney is unlikely to offer a promise of certainty
that the trademark is safe. Thus, the client is faced
with a low probability of risk that a third party somewhere in the marketplace, selling a potentially unrelated product with a remotely similar trademark,
could harm the client’s own trademark rights. A
completely rational client would determine that such
a risk minimal, and only invest a small sum of money
into monitoring the third party usage or countering
any concerning usage with increased advertising
presence. But the certainty effect may cause the client to overvalue certainty, and push for reducing risk
of harm to the trademark to zero…. Additional studies have indicated that “endowment effects will almost certainly occur when owners are faced with the
opportunity to sell an item purchased for use that is
not easily replaceable.” Given the unique nature of
trademarks and the fact that they cannot easily be
bought or sold on an open market, they are in a sense
irreplaceable; consequently, a strong endowment effect should be expected to impact decisions of trademark owners…. This suggests that trademark owners
may overvalue their trademark assets and then invest
122
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irrationally large amounts of time and money into
preventing a loss of those trademarks, even if such a
loss is incredibly unlikely…. Calling the trademarks
“crown jewels,” or viewing them as on par with tangible property, illustrates the tendency of trademark
owners to elevate the status of trademarks to something more significant than mere business assets.
Trademark bullying behavior should be expected in
light of the endowment effect’s interaction with the
uncertain requirements of trademark law’s duty to
police.123
If this were true, the combination of jurisprudential maximalist
assumptions about the right’s reach, the demands of loss aversion
(which overestimates the threat of abandonment) and the endowment effect might combine to produce a pattern of over-zealous assertion of trademark rights. The sunk cost fallacy might then immunize that pattern from rational review. “We have gone after all
these other (non-threatening) brands, what is one more?”
This obviously begs one vital question. If these psychological
traits and jurisprudential assumptions are widely available, why
would they affect Duke so much more than any other university in
terms of its opposition practice? We have no completely satisfactory
answer, but we can see two possibilities.
First, legal consciousness could be more local and less susceptible to correction by rational introspection than the “convergent wisdom of well-lawyered crowds” hypothesis would suggest. Anecdotally, we have observed the formation of path-dependent microcultures of legal attitude. Because of a particular controversy or the
views of an influential individual, a single corporate entity or bureaucratic department develops a “house view” that is markedly at
odds with the rest of legal culture, and then propagates that view
internally through groupthink so that the variance is preserved. In
intellectual property law, some have argued for such a phenomenon
in terms of the patent jurisprudence of the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit, the internet policy of the Clinton Administration
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PTO, and the copyright litigation of the Church of Scientology or
the company Perfect 10.124 Perhaps Duke is such a microculture.
Second, Duke might be a trendsetter. Right now, Duke’s behavior seems both anomalous and ungrounded, but perhaps it is merely
the first university to embrace the psychological framing that Kiser
and others describe. Universities still see themselves as serving different imperatives than for-profit corporations. Perhaps that insulation from the behavioral economics of bullying is eroding and
Duke’s behavior offers us a vision of the future. The Associated
Press story quoted at the beginning of this Article suggests that this
might indeed be the case, as do the Boise State, Stanford, and NYU
stories.125 Our Comparative Study also picked up hints that universities were moving in Duke’s direction in their opposition practice.
Do you want to help launch a “cancer moonshot”? Beware. The University of Texas, which has applied for marks on variations of this
term, has opposed its use by others.126 Also, do not try and register
a mark which includes the American Sign Language hand gesture
for “I love you” or the heavy metaler’s similar gesture. The same
university assiduously protects its mark over a “hook ‘em, horns”
logo, even when the context or field of use seem very different. 127
Do you believe that the fans of your team count as a “12 th man” on
the field? Texas A&M has a trademark over the term and has assiduously opposed others who attempt to register variants of it. 128 And
of course, The Ohio State University is famously trying to trademark
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“The.”129 Both in terms of semantic policing—attempting to guard
the image of the university in ways that go far beyond trademark
law’s actual boundaries—and in terms of merchandising and branding, universities seem to be moving in Duke’s direction. As this Article has tried to show, that would be unfortunate and, arguably, unjust. Though this Article focused on Duke, its conclusion is that universities generally should chart a different path—toward practices
that hew more closely to the goals of both trademark law and of
educational institutions.
Regardless of the causal route for Duke’s outlier status, some
will argue that we are being overly generous to Duke in offering the
“innocent” behavioral economic explanation. We believe, however,
that the comments of university officials provide support for that
more generous explanation, echoing Kiser’s themes of a supremely
valuable asset that must be protected both from a much-overstated
threat of abandonment and from a variety of misuses, some of which
fit poorly under trademark law.130
Some analytical clarity might be useful. Trademark bullying creates two distinct classes of harms. The most obvious one happens if
the conduct is intentional or just reckless in its lack of care. To assert
rights beyond the boundaries of existing law, perhaps in the belief
that my deep pockets will guarantee “a win” regardless of the merits,
is a harm to the integrity of the legal system and violates the individual ethical duty to act truthfully and within the boundaries of the
law. The bully is relying on size to gain resources it does not deserve, or to deny those resources to others. That is why they call it
“bullying.” But what if the entity is simply honestly mistaken, or
systematically deluded, about the limits of trademark law, perhaps
under the influence of the behavioral economic framing effects mentioned above? In that case, some would argue that it is a misnomer
to call it “a bully.”
The person who forcibly takes my school lunch because he truly
believes it to be his lunch is not exactly a “bully,” though he may be
wanting in judgment. Of course, if the trademark overstatements are
routine and routinely ridiculed, then the claim of honest mistake or
129
130
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delusion may meet with skepticism. If someone takes my lunch repeatedly, for years on end, even when he is repeatedly told by me
and others that it isn’t his lunch, and he is a bully for taking it, 131 we
might be dubious about his claims of innocence.
Yet it is important to understand that, even if it were truly a case
of large-scale, persistent honest mistake, there is a second social
harm: routine over-assertion of intellectual property rights damages
legitimate competition and protected speech. Businesses that had a
right to their non-confusing trademark in a different field are losing
something they were entitled to, and the public is losing marks that
might usefully have suggested goods and services they want. In a
thought-provoking recent empirical study, Barton Beebe and Jeanne
Fromer present evidence that we are “running out of trademarks.”132
They argue that the conventional wisdom that there is an ample supply of unclaimed, competitively effective trademarks is wrong, and
that “rates of word-mark depletion and congestion are increasing
and have reached chronic levels.”133 It is important to note that this
can happen even when trademark law is functioning as envisioned;
if Duke can not only claim “Blue Devils” but will routinely oppose
marks that use the word “blue”—from “True Blue” for auto parts to
“Stay Blue” for denim clothing—then this considerably exacerbates
the depletion of useful words. Moreover, entities who are told they
must change the title of their movie, make the fictional, sexually active college students in their TV show go to a different university,
or refrain from playing their sports on a non-green field—all because of a ludicrous claim of trademark infringement—are being
harmed. So are their potential customers and viewers and fans. And
this second set of harms to speech and competition exists regardless
of the intention of the actor involved.
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CONCLUSION

The Comparative Study showed that Duke is a dramatic outlier,
bringing substantially more trademark oppositions than all twentyeight other universities in our three comparison groups combined.
The Merit Study showed that most of those oppositions are legally
ungrounded, with 85% being assessed as “clearly erroneous” or
“far-fetched.” Our analysis argued that this behavior was linked both
to changes in trademark law and to the conception of the university’s
role as a mega-brand, changes which appear to have affected Duke
more than other universities, but which have wider implications. Assume for the sake of argument that you are persuaded by some of
our analysis. Where’s the harm? It seems clear that Duke is overstepping its bounds legally speaking, and that it might be a harbinger
of more general changes in university culture. Still, who cares? We
should.
Universities should stand for the truth. If (and we stress “if”)
they knowingly pursue spurious claims that are not in fact grounded
in existing law, they harm their own ethics and the integrity of the
legal system. We have suggested a more charitable explanation than
knowing misuse here. Still, once made aware of the pattern, the university has an ethical obligation to stop it.
Brands that have every right to their mark for “Bluefood,” their
“Beach’d” clothing line, their “Pretty Devil” slot machines, and
their “Devils Nightmare” alcoholic beverages have either been
forced to spend time and money defending themselves from frivolous claims, or have just abandoned their marks. Duke is rich, powerful, and its lawyers are energetic. But universities should stand for
careful and correct application of the law and against those who
would use size or wealth to bully others. Bullying is an emotive
term, of course, but it accurately describes the actions of an entity
that has no valid claim but nevertheless uses strength, power, and
money to achieve its goals. We argued here that there are plausible
reasons that the combination of a sprawling licensing enterprise and
the indeterminacies of trademark law could produce bullying behavior as a matter of honest mistake. That in turn teaches us about how
hard it is to monitor everything that is going on in the “university as
corporation.” The difficulty of monitoring is central to our most important conclusion: the university as a mega-brand is straying far
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from its traditional role in ways that it is not well set-up to police or
oversee. The stories about Stanford, NYU, Boise State, Texas
A&M, and The Ohio State University indicate that Duke may not be
alone in following that path.
Our study also has policy implications for the law. While we
think that trademark law generally works well, this study illustrates
the way in which a few deviations from its core goals, coupled with
an aggressive business culture of over-assertion, can undermine its
rationale and threaten both competition and speech. The actions of
individual trademark owners can seem merely cause for mirth. Yet
the collective effects of over-assertion of trademarks are serious,
both in terms of restricting competition and in chilling people from
engaging in protected speech about the powerful corporate entities
around them.
More generally, the academic literature on trademark bullying
seems to present a clear picture of systemic abuse which demands
forceful measures to correct. There is no shortage of good ideas for
reform.134
As Professor Eric Goldman has pointed out,135 we need better
data-gathering on examples of trademark bullying, akin to the Lumen Database—formerly called the “Chilling Effects” project—that
keeps track of cease-and-desist letters concerning online content.136
It is hard to rectify a problem until you understand its full extent. He
has also suggested more aggressive fee-shifting in clear cases of
abuse.137
Professor Leah Grinvald has argued that shaming could be an
effective pre-litigation method of discouraging bullying.138 This article would presumably qualify.
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Improvements in machine learning could eventually offer a way
of providing cheap and high-quality legal information to smaller entities, thus lowering the costs of fighting bullying.
We should take more seriously the ethical obligations of lawyers
not to pursue spurious claims.
There should be a method, either through private action, or administrative regulation, of imposing sanctions on repeat, persistent
offenders.
Some of these reforms have real promise, though they currently
face a classic collective action problem—costs are high but spread
over a large group while benefits redound to a small number of repeat players. At the very least, the PTO should return to the issue,
this time with an empirical study of the quality and frequency of
oppositions by repeat players. We offer ours as a prototype.
We think our study also has implications for universities. Are
universities straying from their core goals? Corporations have a
straightforward metric for action: maximize shareholder value. Universities, by contrast, serve many masters—education, research, the
generation and dissemination of knowledge, the preservation of the
scholarly commons, the values of free speech and civil debate, the
interests of the students, faculty, staff and alumni/ae that make up
the university community. It is possible to imagine a world in which
a university transforms itself into a mega-brand while, at every
stage, continuing to respect those values. In that world, the university gains extra revenue, raises its visibility and stays true to its core
mission—a win-win situation. It is also possible, and we would argue, likely, that in areas ranging from aggressive patent licensing
practices,139 to the trademark excesses we document here, to largescale college athletics,140 universities have lost their way. The latter
comparison may be particularly revealing. Consider the testimony
of Sonny Vaccaro to the Knight Commission on Intercollegiate Athletics:

139

See Mark A. Lemley, Are Universities Patent Trolls?, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 611, 611–12 (2008).
140
See generally GERALD GURNEY ET AL., UNWINDING MADNESS: WHAT WENT WRONG
WITH COLLEGE SPORTS—AND HOW TO FIX IT (2017).
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“I’m not hiding,” Sonny Vaccaro told a closed hearing at the Willard Hotel in Washington, D.C., in
2001. “We want to put our materials on the bodies of
your athletes, and the best way to do that is buy your
school. Or buy your coach.” Vaccaro’s audience, the
members of the Knight Commission on Intercollegiate Athletics, bristled. These were eminent reformers—among them the president of the National Collegiate Athletic Association, two former heads of the
U.S. Olympic Committee, and several university
presidents and chancellors…. Not all the members
could hide their scorn for the “sneaker pimp” of
schoolyard hustle, who boasted of writing checks for
millions to everybody in higher education. “Why,”
asked Bryce Jordan, the president emeritus of Penn
State, “should a university be an advertising medium
for your industry?” Vaccaro did not blink. “They
shouldn’t, sir,” he replied. “You sold your souls, and
you’re going to continue selling them. You can be
very moral and righteous in asking me that question,
sir,” Vaccaro added with irrepressible good cheer,
“but there’s not one of you in this room that’s going
to turn down any of our money. You’re going to take
it. I can only offer it.”141
Being a trademark bully, in other words, is part of a larger transformation about which universities should think long and hard.
What is to be done? Our suggestion is a wide-ranging value-audit,
in which the university asks a group of internal stakeholders and external advisors to assess the coherence of the university’s various
activities with its multiple missions. There are many possible definitions of “mission-creep” but a pretty good one is the point at which
a university claims to be in the business of producing goods and services “in virtually all areas of endeavor, to men, women and children of all ages.”142
141

Taylor Branch, The Shame of College Sports, ATLANTIC MONTHLY (Oct. 2011),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2011/10/the-shame-of-collegesports/308643/ [https://perma.cc/EJ89-7VT8].
142
Opp’n No. 91,241,466 at 11 (filed May 30, 2018).
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We do not romanticize universities; we work at one. We experience the quotidian idealistic delight and frequent disillusionment of
big academe. But we care about universities’ core values. Those values seem very strange to the larger society. Why study unpopular
ideas? Why care passionately about the truth, even when it doesn’t
pay? They are also profoundly fragile. It is possible, of course, that
an institution could cherish those values and also become a commercial mega-brand culture with a dubious connection to veracity.
We would not take that bet.
Right now, Duke is an anomaly. Will it be one in the future?
Perhaps in the domain of trademark oppositions. As we have tried
to demonstrate, many of Duke’s trademark oppositions are expensive, legally ungrounded and, while interfering with the legitimate
businesses of others, produce little for Duke beyond bad publicity.
But what about the wider attempts to use baseless intellectual property claims to police activities universities do not like? There we
think that Duke’s aggressiveness might represent the future. We
fear, in fact, that Duke is boldly bullying where many universities
will eventually follow. We hope this Article sounds a warning.
Universities should not be trademark bullies, or for that matter,
copyright or patent trolls. If they do not remember this fact, will athletic shoe licensing revenue, satisfaction from stopping an unrelated
business from gaining marks they have every right to, claiming ownership of the definite article, or preventing fictional portrayals of
sexually active or larcenous students compensate for the loss? We
doubt it. To our university we would quote another Duke (Ellington), “A problem is a chance for you to do your best.”143 And, no,
we don’t own his name either.
Earlier, we mentioned “the preservation of the scholarly commons” as one of a university’s core goals. At the time of writing,
Duke had filed one more trademark. It is over the phrase “Scholarly
Commons.”144 That is exquisite irony, of course. But, as our study
143

ASHTON APPLEWHITE ET AL., AND I QUOTE: THE DEFINITIVE COLLECTION OF QUOTES,
SAYINGS, AND JOKES FOR THE CONTEMPORARY SPEECHMAKER 57 (2d ed. 2003).
144
See U.S. Trademark Serial No. 87,946,903 (filed June 4, 2018). The term “scholarly
commons” is widely used by a national community of institutional academic repositories
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shows, it may be disturbingly emblematic of the future of academic
intellectual property.
APPENDIX A

Methodology
Merit Study
The starting point for this project was the public database of proceedings before the TTAB.145 Searching “Duke” yields its filings.
We compiled a database of information regarding over 800 proceedings filed by Duke from 2015-2018, including 136 opposition or
cancellation proceedings.146
We prepared analyses of recurring issues. Section 2(d) of the
Lanham Act allows challenges to marks that “so resemble[] a mark
registered in the Patent and Trademark Office, or a mark or trade
name previously used in the United States by another and not abandoned, as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the goods
of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive.”147 There are elaborate, competing tests for likelihood of confusion. Our methodology focused on three factors that would be central to the analysis before both the PTO or Fourth Circuit (where
Duke is located)—the strength of Duke’s relevant marks, the similarity of Duke’s and the applicant’s marks, and the proximity of the

who, we predict, would be mightily displeased to see Duke claiming ownership of it. See
Search of Scholarly Commons, GOOGLE (Jan. 8, 2021, 1:05 PM),
https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=%22scholarly+commons%22
[https://perma.cc/9JR3-S6ZS]. There are reasons to use trademark law to protect a
commons. Creative Commons does so, to prevent people falsely claiming to be providing
Creative Commons licenses. But while trademarks can protect the commons, they can also
be used—wrongly—to expropriate portions of it.
145
See Trademark Trial and Appeal Board Inquiry System, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK
OFFICE, http://ttabvue.uspto.gov/ttabvue/ [https://perma.cc/8UQX-9UKW].
146
The publicly available documents we reviewed were sometimes incomplete or
ambiguous, with conflicting designations. We have made every effort to double-check our
findings but cannot exclude the possibility of the PTO’s data being inaccurate in some
cases. Having said that, the overall picture remains clear.
147
15 U.S.C. § 1052(d).
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respective goods or services.148 (Where relevant, however, we also
analyzed other factors, such as bad faith or actual confusion.)

148

Circuits have formulated different multi-factor tests for likelihood of confusion that
have similar, but not identical, factors. The PTO relies on the so-called DuPont factors,
which are:
(1) The similarity or dissimilarity of the marks in their entireties as to
appearance, sound, connotation and commercial impression.
(2) The similarity or dissimilarity and nature of the goods or services
as described in an application or registration or in connection with
which a prior mark is in use.
(3) The similarity or dissimilarity of established, likely-to-continue
trade channels.
(4) The conditions under which and buyers to whom sales are made,
i.e. “impulse” vs. careful, sophisticated purchasing.
(5) The fame of the prior mark (sales, advertising, length of use).
(6) The number and nature of similar marks in use on similar goods.
(7) The nature and extent of any actual confusion.
(8) The length of time during and conditions under which there has
been concurrent use without evidence of actual confusion.
(9) The variety of goods on which a mark is or is not used (house mark,
“family” mark, product mark).
(10) The market interface between applicant and the owner of a prior
mark.
(11) The extent to which applicant has a right to exclude others from
use of its mark on its goods.
(12) The extent of potential confusion, i.e., whether de minimis or
substantial.
(13) Any other established fact probative of the effect of use.
In re E. I. DuPont DeNemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361 (C.C.P.A. 1973). The PTO
explains that the “key considerations” are the first and second factors above. U.S. PATENT
& TRADEMARK OFFICE, TRADEMARK MANUAL OF EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 1207.01 (Oct.
2018), available at https://tmep.uspto.gov/RDMS/TMEP/current#/current/TMEP1200d1e5036.html [https://perma.cc/HPZ9-U53T]. However, Duke is located in North
Carolina, in the 4th Circuit, and if a case were litigated there, the factors would be the seven
factors outlined by the 4th Circuit in Pizzeria Uno Corp. v. Temple, 747 F.2d 1522,
1527 (4th Cir. 1984):
1) the strength or distinctiveness of the mark;
2) the similarity of the two marks;
3) the similarity of the goods/services the marks identify;
4) the similarity of the facilities the two parties use in their businesses;
5) the similarity of the advertising used by the two parties;
6) the defendant’s intent;
7) actual confusion.
In practice, both the courts and the PTO focus on the similarity of the marks and the
proximity of the goods or services they identify, and it is on those factors, along with
strength of the prior mark, that our analysis concentrated.
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We standardized recurring issues concerning Duke’s particular
intellectual property portfolio, including the strength and distinctiveness of Duke’s various marks (for example, “Duke”, “Devil,”
“Blue Devil,” “D,” and “Blue”), the law on single-letter marks (for
Duke’s “D” based claims), and the proximity of Duke’s marks to
those it regularly targets, including alcoholic beverages, sports
drinks, and restaurant services. We also applied uniform analyses of
whether the “Duke” marks are famous for dilution purposes, and
section 2(a)’s bar on registering marks that “falsely suggest a connection with… institutions.”149 Using these rubrics, our research
team coded the oppositions and cancellations on the following fourpoint scale.
(1) Clearly Erroneous: completely ungrounded as a matter of existing law.
(2) Far-fetched: unlikely to prevail.
(3) Arguable: existing trademark doctrine presents reasons why
the application might, or might not, succeed, but Duke has some
good arguments.
(4) Sound: the opposition was well-grounded in existing trademark law and Duke would prevail were the matter to be litigated.
Because the initial coding would be performed by multiple people, we shared examples of the classification metric from each year,
together with accompanying legal reasoning, to ensure consistency.
Finally, the authors reviewed each assessment, recoding if necessary. We wish again to express our gratitude to our four superb research assistants, Matt Gibbons, Michael Dale, Joe Bianco and
Anupam Dalvi. Thanks go also to Balfour Smith, the Program Coordinator at the Center for the Study of the Public Domain. His work
on data analysis and visualization was invaluable. The authors are
solely responsible for any errors and for the views put forward here.
They do not, of course, speak on behalf of Duke University.

149

U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, TRADEMARK MANUAL
PROCEDURE § 1203.03(c) (Oct. 2018).
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